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 The Greek antiquarian Plutarch (c. 49- 120 AD) wrote that when the Roman 
proconsul Titus Quinctius Flamininus announced the “Freedom of the Greeks” at the 
Isthmian Games in 196, the shouts of joy were so loud that ravens flying overhead were 
knocked out the sky.
1
  Polybius (c. 200- 118 BC) said that in the same year, the Aetolians 
claimed that the Romans were conquering the Greeks, taking over “the fetters of Greece, and 
that what was happening was a readjustment of masters.”
2
  While the historical accuracy of 
these two references may be questioned, they illustrate two seemingly opposed views of 
Roman intervention in the East during the late 3
rd




  The purpose 
of this study is to reexamine Greek attitudes towards Roman intervention in the East from 
217 to 167 and to argue that Greek views varied through time and according to the Republics 
actions in Greece. In some cases, Roman involvement was resented: the Western power was 
seen as a threat to the safety and freedom of Hellas. However, Rome also frequently left 
matters in Greece to the Greeks or even aided Greeks against other states. Greek views of 
Roman imperialism during the period of the Macedonian Wars (c. 217-167) were complex, 
varying according to the actions of the Republic and the needs of the Greeks.  
 
Historical Overview  
  Before 215, Rome paid little attention to the various Greek city-states and leagues on 
mainland Greece and the Peloponnese, the Aegean islands, the Greeks in Asia-Minor or the 
                                                 
1
 Plut. Flam. 10.6. 
2
 For Greek texts I have used published translations, except for a few inscriptions where translations 
were not readily available. I have included the original Greek for citations for which I was unable to 
locate a published translation. Latin translations are my own. Translations of Polybius are from Paton. 
Polyb. 18.45.6. 
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  Rome had fought two wars in Illyria, across the Adriatic from 
Italy and northwest of mainland Greece. Both wars ended in Roman victories. The two 
Illyrian Wars – the first in 229 instigated by Italian traders concerned with Illyrian piracy, 
and another in 219 sparked by the growing influence of the Illyrian monarch Demetrius – did 
not seriously engage Rome in Greece. Instead, Rome’s focus was on the western 
Mediterranean, Italy, and North Africa. 
 Between 215 and 167, Eastern powers fought four major wars against the Republic. 
In the First (215 BC to 205) and Second Macedonian Wars (200-197), Rome and a number 
of Greek allies fought against Philip V of Macedonia. The First Macedonian War began 
when Philip made a treaty with the Carthaginians, with whom Rome was currently engaged 
in the Second Punic War (218-201). Sparta, Messene, and the Aetolian League, a federal 
coalition of Greek city-states in southern mainland Greece, allied themselves with Rome 
against Philip and a number of his Greek allies. The war ended with the Peace of Phoenice in 
205.  
 After embassies from a number of Greek states came to Rome seeking aid against 
Philip and Antiochus III of Syria, Rome entered into a second war against Philip. The two 
most powerful Greek federal leagues, the Aetolian and Achaean Leagues, sided with Rome, 
along with a number of other less powerful Greek states. The Second Macedonian War ended 
with the Roman proconsul Titus Quinctius Flamininus’ victory over Philip at the Battle of 
Cynoscephalae in 197. At the Isthmian Games at Corinth in 196, Flamininus proclaimed the 
“Freedom of the Greeks,” and after two years Rome removed all of its forces from the East. 
In the same year as the Isthmian Declaration, according to Polybius, Rome issued an order to 
Antiochus III of Syria that he not cross into Europe.  
                                                 
4
 The main ancient sources for the narrative of this period are Polybius and Livy.  
3  
 The Aetolian League, Rome’s ally in the previous two wars, had been dissatisfied 
with the settlement after Cynoscephalae and over the next few years openly criticized Rome. 
In 192, the Syrian king directly opposed the order Rome had given to him by bringing his 
army into Greece. The Aetolian League sided with the Antiochus, and both fought against 
Rome and the Republic’s Greek allies. Antiochus suffered major defeats at Thermopylae in 
191 and Magnesia in 190. The war finally ended with the Peace of Apamea in 188. With 
Antiochus defeated, Roman forces again returned back across the Adriatic.  
 After Magnesia, Rome had overcome the two most powerful Hellenistic kings and 
demonstrated that it was the most powerful state in the Mediterranean. For the following 
fifteen years, Roman interaction with Greeks was mostly limited to embassies and 
commissioners who arbitrated Greek disputes. In 179, Philip was succeeded by his son 
Perseus. Early on Perseus gathered support around Greece by allowing fugitives to return to 
Macedonia. In 172, King Eumenes II of Pergamum came to Rome to level charges against 
Perseus. Eumenes emphasized the wealth and resources that Macedonia had accrued, and 
said that Perseus was moving his army around Thessaly, causing unrest there and in 
Perrhaebia. In the Third Macedonian War (171-168), Roman forces again crossed the 
Adriatic, this time to combat Philip’s son. The war ended with Lucius Aemilius Paullus’ 
victory over Perseus at the Battle of Pydna in 168.  
 Between 215 and 168 Rome did not annex territory, install governors, or depose 
rulers in Greece. For much of this period, Rome did not even have garrisons stationed across 
the Adriatic. However, after Perseus’ defeat in 168, the kingdom of Macedonia was divided 
into four separate states. Aemilius Paullus decimated Epirus and sold much of the population 
into slavery. Greek politicians who opposed Rome were put to death or exiled, and even 
4  
Greeks who tried to maintain an appearance of neutrality, such as the Rhodians, were 
punished by the Romans. 
 
Sources 
 The most important sources for this period are the ancient historians Polybius and 
Livy. Polybius (ca. 200 to 118) lived though most of the period under investigation and was 
an active participant in Achaean League politics. After the defeat of Perseus in 168, Polybius 
was accused by Callicrates, one of his political rivals, of anti-Romanism, and was held 
hostage at Rome from 167 to 150. During this time Polybius began to write his Histories, 
with the goal of documenting “the how, when, and wherefore all the known parts of the 
world came under the domination of Rome.”
5
  Polybius lived at a time when it was 
“universally accepted as a necessary fact that henceforth all must submit to the Romans and 
obey their orders.”
6
  He originally intended to write 30 books on this subject, but after 146, 




 Polybius lived through and witnessed some of the events in his Histories, but for 
much of his work he had to rely on other sources. These sources may have included 
interviews with other eye-witnesses, the Memoirs of Aratus of Sicyon, Achaean League 
archives from Aegium, Roman public records, some published speeches, the library of the 
                                                 
5
 Polyb. 3.1.4. 
6
 Polyb. 3.4.2. 
7
 Polyb. 3.4.6. 
5  
Antigonid kings that was brought to Rome by Polybius’ friend Lucius Aemilius Paullus, and 
the works of other historians, both Greek and Roman.
8
   
 Not all of Polybius 40 books have survived. Gaps in his account can be filled in by 
the Augustan historian Livy (c. 59 BC- 17 AD). Livy wrote a history of Rome, Ab Urbe 
Condita, in 142 books. His work was the culmination of the Roman annalistic tradition that 
had begun with the first Roman historian Fabius Pictor, who wrote at the beginning of the 2
nd
 
century. Neither Polybius’ nor Livy’s entire work is extant, and it is rare that the surviving 
portions of Polybius and Livy cover the same year. Besides not being contemporary to these 
events, Livy rarely, if ever, directly uses primary source material.
9
  While he may have used 
some extant speeches of Cato the Elder, and he certainly used Polybius, most of his 
information came from other Roman historians who were not primary sources themselves.
10
  
 There is some debate over which annalists Livy read and which he knew through an 
intermediary source.
11
 Whichever annalists he read, there were only a limited number of 
sources available in Rome which they could have used. These included the Annales Maximi, 
the libri lintei, senatus consulta, private collections, and other historians.
12
 The Annales 
Maximi were records of events compiled by the pontifex maximus that contained information 
on elections, prodigies, and public events.
13
 The libri lintei were lists of magistrates housed 
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Cecil Wooten, “The Speeches in Polybius: An Insight into the Nature of Hellenistic Oratory,” The 
American Journal of Philology 95 (1974): 235; F.W. Walbank, A Historical Commentary on Polybius 
I (Oxford: Clarendon, 1957), 12. 
9
 P.G. Walsh, Livy: His Historical Aims and Methods (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1961), 110. 
10
 Livy 39. 43. 
11
 Walsh, Livy, 115; James T. Luce, Livy: The Composition of His History (Princeton: Princeton UP, 
1977), 161.  
12
 Walsh, Livy, 110-112. 
13
 McDonald, OCD, 54, s.v. “Annals, Annalists.”  Attempts to recreate the information contained in 
the Annales are highly speculative. Bruce Frier contends that the ancient authors who discussed the 
Annales knew very little about the actual chronicle and their recreation of its history stemmed from an 
attempt to rationalize the annalistic tradition. Bruce Frier, Libri Annales Pontificum Maximorum: the 
Origins of the Annalistic Tradition (Rome: American Academy of Rome, 1979), 177-8. 
6  
in the Temple of Juno Montea.
14
 Senatus consulta, or senatorial decrees, laws, and important 
treaties were also preserved in the treasury.
15
 Livy does not seem to have consulted these 
sources himself, but these documents were available to the other historians whom Livy read.  
 While Polybius and Livy are the sources that discuss this period most 
comprehensively, other ancient sources also provide evidence for Greek views of Rome. 
Special attention will be paid to other sources from the early second century B.C. The Greek 
poet Alcaeus of Messene lived through the Second Macedonian War, and wrote poems 
praising Rome and criticizing the Macedonian king. Inscriptions documenting Greek 
relations with Rome, such as letters or treaties, also provide valuable primary source 
material. The later authors Pausanias (c. 150 AD), Plutarch, Phlegon of Tralles (early 2
nd
 




 centuries AD) all wrote on the events from this 
period, and drew on earlier sources that are no longer extant.  
 Various opinions have been expressed on how Greeks reacted to the increased 
presence of the Republic. Some scholars think Greeks primarily resented Rome’s 
interference in their spheres of influence and feared subjugation to the western power. For 
Dmitriev, Roman violence in the First Macedonian War led Greeks to view Rome as a threat 
to peace and to their freedom.
16
  When the Romans used the slogan of freedom to provide a 
casus belli in Greece, Antiochus responded by claiming to be liberating Greece from Rome. 
Rome was on the defensive in the propaganda war in the 190s.
17
  By Polybius’ time Greeks 
in general viewed Romans as barbarians, but Greeks politicians attempted to work with 
Romans or use Roman support to further their own political ends.  
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 Walsh, Livy, 111. 
15
 Walsh, Livy, 112. 
16
 Sviatoslav Dmitriev, The Greek Slogan of Freedom and Early Roman Politics in Greece (New 
York: Oxford Up, 2011), 147. 
17
 Dmitriev, Greek Slogan of Freedom, 217. 
7  
 Fear is the recurring element in Greek attitudes toward Rome according to C. 
Champion. Champion thinks that Greeks saw the Western invaders as ruthless and barbaric.
18
  
Derow argues that Roman brutality in the First Macedonian War coupled with resurgence in 
Panhellenic solidarity in the 3
rd
 century resulted in a negative view of Rome. Rome 
recognized the need for better public relations in Greece, and attempted to redefine itself with 
the “Freedom of the Greeks” slogan. Whatever effect this had in Greece had worn off by 192. 
Derow claims that Polybius’ assertion that it was necessary “to give heed to the Romans and 
obey them in their orders” after 167 also applies to the period after 188.
19
  
 Another group of scholars see Greek views as having been shaped by Greek states’ 
relationships with other Hellenistic powers. For these scholars, Roman intervention was a 
necessary evil. E. Gruen thinks that Greeks had not formulated a clear image of Rome prior 
to the 2
nd
 century because the Greeks had little interaction with Rome.
 20
   Beginning with the 
Second Macedonian War, bewilderment was the main emotion felt by Greeks concerning 
Rome. Some Greeks sought Roman intervention, others feared the Republic, but most Greeks 
were puzzled when the Senate made little effort to enforce its will and often gave vague 
replies to Greek ambassadors.
21
  
 A. Eckstein agrees with Gruen that the Greeks were not primarily hostile to Roman 
involvement. In Eckstein’s opinion there was significant distrust among Greeks toward Rome 
prior to 202. After a child inherited the throne of Egypt in 204, Antiochus and Philip made an 
                                                 
18
 Craige Champion, Cultural Politics in Polybius’ Histories (Berkeley: University of California, 
2004), 52-55. 
19
 Polyb. 3.4; Peter Derow, “The Arrival of Rome: From the Illyrian Wars to the Fall of Macedon,” in 
A Companion to the Hellenistic World, ed. Andrew Erskine (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), 67-8. 
20
 Erich S. Gruen, The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome (Berkley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1984), 324-3.  
21
 Gruen, The Hellenistic World, 330-1, 438.  
8  
alliance in order to take control of Egypt.
22
 The Pact between the Kings made a Greek 
alliance with Rome necessary if the delicate balance of power in the Mediterranean was to be 
restored.
23
  After the Second Macedonian War ended, Greek contemporaries did not view 
Isthmian Declaration as a sham, but thought that the Roman’s bestowal of freedom was 
genuine.
24
  Rome’s Greek allies in the Syrian War acted through fear of both Antiochus and 
Rome.
25
  After 188, Greeks recognized that Rome had achieved a position of unipolarity. 
Eckstein says that recognition of Greek libertas did not rule out Roman auctoritas.   
 The purpose of this study is to re-evaluate the sources, and to provide a new approach 
to the study of Greek views of Roman imperialism. While the narratives of ancient writers 
are essential to this project, special attention will be paid to other types of sources, such as 
inscriptions, or ancient prophecy. Through these sources, it may be possible to filter out 
additions by later authors, and gain a better understanding of Greek attitudes toward Roman 
intervention in the East.  
 In Chapter I, I examine the evidence from speeches written by Polybius and Livy. 
Both historians based the speeches in their histories on historical sources but also had their 
own biases and viewpoints which affected the content of those speeches. These speeches 
cannot be completely disregarded as historical evidence but must be approached with 
                                                 
22
 Arthur Eckstein, Rome Enters the Greek East: From Anarchy to Hierarchy in the Hellenistic 
Mediterranean, 230-170 BC (Malden: Blackwell, 2008), 129-180. Eckstein accepts the existence of 
the Pact as Polybius describes it. Richard Berthold, Rhodes in the Hellenistic Age (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 
1984), 110-1 accepts the existence of a modified version of the Pact in which Antiochus and Philip 
agreed not to enter each other’s spheres of influence. Errington and Magie reject the existence of any 
major agreement between the kings. R.M. Errington, “The Alleged Syro-Macedonian Pact and the 
Origins of the Second Macedonian War,” Athenaeum 49 (1971):  353-4 and David Magie, “The 
‘Agreement’ between Philip V and Antiochus III for the Partition of the Egyptian Empire,” Journal of 
Roman Studies 29 (1939): 42.  
23
 A. Eckstein, Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome (Berkley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 2006), 278.  
24
 Eckstein. Rome Enters the Greek East, 297. 
25
 Eckstein, Rome Enters the Greek East, 329. 
9  
caution. In Chapters II and III evidence other than speeches is analyzed in order to 
demonstrate two different views of Rome.  In Chapter II, I show that Rome’s hesitation to 
exert its control over Greece and the assistance the Republic offered to various Greeks 
resulted in many Greeks being grateful for Roman intervention.  In Chapter III, I argue that 
Roman actions in the East were not always welcome and that some Greeks resented Roman 
power, especially after the end of the Syrian War in 188.  Multiple views of Rome existed at 
the same time and conflicted with one another, but any discussion of Greek views of Roman 
imperialism in the 2
nd
 century that excludes one of these views does not accurately represent 



























CHAPTER ONE:  SPEECHES 
 
 
 Throughout the works of Polybius and Livy, the authors placed speeches in the 
mouths of their characters. Ancient speeches are one of the most common pieces of evidence 




  It is critical to 
recognize that these are not direct transcriptions of the words as they were originally spoken: 
they were compositions of the historian. Even when a published speech was available, 
ancient historians might re-write the speech that their character delivers.
2
 This was not 
unique to Polybius and Livy, but was standard practice for ancient historians. This does not 
mean that the sources available on the content of those speeches were completely ignored. 
The value of each speech for determining Greek views of Rome during the late 3
rd
 and early 
2
nd
 centuries varies according to each author’s practices in recording speeches, the sources he 
had available to him, and how each speech fits into each author’s view of history.  
 Polybius’ speeches, while based on source material, were not verbatim transcriptions 
of those sources, but reflect the author’s biases and hindsight.  Polybius himself witnessed 
some of the events he describes, but his history begins long before his own lifetime. He 
stressed that historians should not invent speeches, and he probably followed his sources for 
his own version of each speech. However, the Greek historian began writing his Histories as 
an exile in Rome, and his view of history ended with Roman control over the Mediterranean. 
Any discussion of the speeches in his work must take into account both the period in which 
Polybius wrote and the period in which the speeches he reports were originally delivered.  
                                                 
1
 E.g. Eckstein, Rome Enters the Greek East, 107-111; Derow, “Arrival of Rome,” 56-7.  
2
 Walsh, Livy, 219 e.g. Sallust wrote the speeches of Caesar and Cato at Cat. 51., although he had 
access to the originals.  
11  
 Like Polybius, Livy had his characters deliver speeches. Livy’s sources for his 
speeches were often not as reliable as those of Polybius. While Polybius may have personally 
observed some of the speeches he relates, or interviewed others who were in attendance, Livy 
was writing over a century after the events he describes. Although Livy’s sources were rarely 
eye-witnesses, he often closely follows the content of the speeches in his sources, with his 
own stylistic embellishment.
3
  The speeches he found in the works of other historians were 
also likely compositions of those historians. Livy relied heavily on Polybius for his account 
of Rome’s Eastern wars, and the speeches in Livy often closely correspond to Polybius’ 
version. Because Livy depended on Polybius, the Roman historian’s speeches’ were 
indirectly based on historical sources. However, these speeches also reflected the combined 
biases and goals of Polybius and Livy.  
 
217 to 207 
 According to Polybius, at the council of Naupactus in 217 BC Agelaus cautioned the 
Greeks to stop waging war against each other.
4
 The Second Punic War between Rome and 
Carthage had recently erupted, and Agelaus told his audience that whoever won that war 
would inevitably seek power and control in the East. Rome and Carthage were “clouds that 
loom in the west,” and Agelaus begged Philip V to stop waging war with the Greeks, and 
instead turn his attention to the war in Italy.
5
  The Greek speaker told the Macedonian king 
that in Italy he could fight for global sovereignty. The style of the speeches is the same as 
Polybius’ style in the rest of his work, which shows that even those speeches that are 
                                                 
3
 Walsh, Livy, 231; Luce, Livy: The Composition of His History, 151. 
4
Polyb. 5.104. This chapter is organized in chronological order because there is a shift in Greek 
attitudes over time.  
5
 Polyb. 5.104.8. 
12  
reported in direct discourse are not quotations.
6
   The problem is how much Polybius’ version 
of Agelaus’ speech preserves the original message conveyed at Naupactus, and to what 
extent the fears expressed by Agelaus reveal Greek attitudes towards Rome in 217.  
 There are a number of approaches to the speech of Agelaus. O. Morkholm thinks it is 
a theoretical fabrication of Polybius. Morkholm argues that the reference to Carthage as a 
threat to Greece is a clear indication that Polybius’ voice is coming through. There is no 
evidence that Carthage was interested in Greece, but Polybius’ frequently interprets the 
Second Punic War as the decisive battle for control of the Mediterranean.
7
  Furthermore, 
there was no way Agelaus could have known about Philip’s territorial ambitions in Italy, and 
this appeal made by the Greek indicates that the speech is anachronistic.
8
  Dmitriev disagrees 
that the Greeks could not have anticipated Philip’s plans after the news of the recent Roman 
defeat at Lake Trasimene, and adds that the theme of Hellenic unity was common in this 




 E. Gruen admits that many of the speeches in Polybius’ Histories emphasize the 
theme of Greek unity, but sees this as grounds for suspicion. Further, even if Agelaus did 
refer to the west, it need not represent serious Greek concerns but may have been merely a 
rhetorical ploy of Agelaus.
10
  B. McGing concedes that the speech was given before Rome 
had expressed much interest in the East, but he does not see this as grounds to discount 
Polybius’ version entirely. Agelaus still may have made this point, and perhaps his warning 
                                                 
6
 Wooten, “The Speeches in Polybius,” 237.  
7
 Otto Morkholm, "The Speech of Agelaus at Naupactus 217 B.C.,” Classica et Mediaevalia 28 
(1967): 248. 
8
 Morkholm, “The Speech of Agelaus,” 251.  
9
 Dmitriev, Greek Slogan of Freedom, 148, 151. 
 
10
 Gruen, The Hellenistic World, 324.  
13  
about the West was what made his speech stand out.
11
  A. Eckstein accepts the metaphor of 
the clouds as referring to both Rome and Carthage and as belonging to Agelaus’ original 
speech, as well as many other elements of Polybius’ narrative that have been questioned by 
more skeptical scholars.
12
  Finally, C. Champion sees it as plausible that Greeks felt that the 
war in the west may eventually affect them, and proposes that the famous metaphor may 
have been what made Agelaus’ speech worth remembering.
13
  
 One of the main arguments used in favor of the authenticity of the speech is Polybius’ 
emphasis on reporting speeches that were actually spoken. In Book Twelve of his history, 
Polybius harshly accused Timaeus, a Greek historian from Sicily who lived from around 350 
to 260, of inventing speeches: Timaeus included in his work what “ought to have been said,” 
and not “the words spoken nor the sense of what was really said.”
14
  For Polybius, the two 
most important aspects of writing speeches were to record “the words actually spoken, 
whatever they were, and next to ascertain the reason why what was done or spoken led to 
failure or success.”
15
  This will allow the reader to learn from the past.  
 Polybius also says that he does not object to recording “possible speeches,” but it was 
not “his principle to do this on any and every pretext.” He says that he recorded possible 
speeches when he “quoted both the speeches and the writings of politicians.”
16
  Polybius 
could mean that his speeches represent whatever one could say in such a historical situation. 
However, because of Polybius’ interest in “the words actually spoken”, it is more likely that 
he did not invent speeches that he felt fit in with the situation, but rather that, of all the 
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 Brian McGing, Polybius' Histories (New York: Oxford UP), 89. 
12
 Eckstein, Rome Enters the Greek East, 83, 117.  
13
 Craige Champion, "The Nature of Authoritative Evidence in Polybius and Agelaus' Speech at 
Naupactus," Transactions of the American Philological Association 127 (1997): 119. 
14
 Polyb. 12.25a5. 
15
 Polyb. 12.25b.1.  
16
 Polyb. 36.1.1. 
14  
available versions of a speech that came to him in his sources, he chose what he felt was 
most historically accurate.
17
  It may also be argued that Polybius criticized Timaeus for 
creating speeches when none was delivered; he himself created speeches, but only for 
instances when he knows someone spoke. Polybius’ emphasis on “the words actually 
spoken” would not fit with this interpretation. Polybius also could not be interested in how 
what was said resulted in success or failure if he completely invents the speeches in his work.  
 Polybius tried to find sources for the speeches he included in his work, and usually 
follows those sources. His emphasis on personal experience in writing history also caused 
him to impose his own view of history on his narrative. Polybius does not place much 
emphasis on written documents, saying that “industry in the study of documents is only a 
third part of history and only stands in the third place,”
18
  besides studying physical features 
of historical sites, and having experience in politics.
19
  Instead he selected the best of all 
possible speeches through “reasoning from our personal experience in the past.”
20
  He also 
says in his criticism of Timaeus that “the most important part of history” is “to inquire from 
as many people as possible, to believe those worthy of belief and to be an adequate critic of 
the reports that reach him.”
21
 Polybius seems to have recorded historical speeches by 
evaluating the sources he had, including oral accounts, based on his own experience. In light 
of Polybius’ personal experience as a hostage in Rome, it is no surprise that Agelaus’ speech 
mentions a threat from the West. The speech of Agelaus as related by Polybius is an 
anachronistic reconstruction of whatever sources the historian had, based on Polybius’ 
personal experiences and hindsight from after 167.  
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 Champion, “The Nature of Authoritative Evidence,” 114.  
18
 Polyb. 12.25i.2.  
19




 Polyb. 12.25i.8. 
21
 Polyb. 12.4c.2-5, cf. Walbank Commentary I: 27. 
15  
 It is difficult to gauge the truth of the tradition as it was received by Polybius as we 
do not have his sources, but the important points that Agelaus makes are similar to points 
Polybius makes throughout his work. This lends support to the idea that Agelaus’ words were 
largely Polybius’ creation. The speech at Naupactus also touched on Philip V’s territorial 
ambitions in Italy: Agelaus encouraged Philip to look to Italy, so he could “compete for the 
sovereignty of the world.”
22
  In this speech, Greek fear of Rome and Carthage and Philip’s 
plan in Italy were both aspects of the coming together of the Eastern and Western halves of 
the Mediterranean that plays a major role in Polybius’ view of history.
23
  This coming 
together may have been mentioned in the sources for the speech that Polybius had, and he 
used it as an opportunity to bring attention to this aspect of his Histories.
24
 As McGing points 
out, Polybius chose to record only Agelaus’ speech from this conference, although there were 




 Polybius claims that Agelaus’ speech was important in convincing the combatants to 
agree to peace, but this is misleading. Agelaus was mentioned a few other times by Polybius, 
and later in 217 was elected strategus by the Aetolians, a federal league of city-states on the 
Greek mainland, because of his role in ending the war with Philip.
26
  However, the Aetolians 
were eager for peace before Agelaus delivered his speech, and Philip was considering 
seeking an end to the war as well.
27
  Agelaus “made all the allies disposed for peace and 
especially Philip, as the words in which he addressed him accorded well with his present 
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 Polyb. 5.104.7.  
23
 Eckstein, Rome Enters the Greek East, 83; Morkholm, “the Speech of Agelaus,” 251.  
24
 Champion, “the Nature of Authoritative Evidence,” 117; Gruen, the Hellenistic World, 323.  
25
 McGing, Polybius‘ Histories, 89.  
26
 Polyb. 5.107.5. 
27




 Both sides already wanted peace. Furthermore, according to Polybius Philip 
was not moved by Agelaus’ discussion of the threat from Rome but by the Aetolian’s appeal 
to Philip’s territorial ambitions in Italy.
29
  The speech does not reflect serious Greek concern 
for the coming of Rome. Rather, one speaker at the conference drew attention to Rome, and 
Polybius used these words to emphasize his view of history.   
 The question of the authenticity of the speech is not the only reason to doubt that 
Agelaus’ words in Polybius’ Histories accurately reflect Greek fear. Rome had shown little 
interest in Greece prior to 217.  Rome’s only significant interaction with the Greeks had been 
to announce the Roman victory in the First Illyrian War in 228. This resulted in the Romans 
being admitted to the Isthmian Games by Corinth, which does not suggest hostile relations 
between Greeks and Romans.
 30
 By 217, Rome was engaged in a war with Carthage in which 
victory was by no means certain. Rome had recently suffered a disastrous defeat at Lake 
Trasimene that may have spurred Philip to plan an expedition to Italy.
31
  It would be odd if at 
that moment, the Greeks were also concerned about the threat posed by Roman strength.  
 Six years later, the threat from Rome was mentioned in a speech of Lycsicus reported 
by Polybius, and Rome was once again referred to as “a cloud from the west.”
32
  Rome was 
still fighting Carthage, but Philip V of Macedonia had made an alliance with Hannibal 
against Rome. Rome responded by making an alliance with the Aetolian League. Polybius 
recreated two speeches delivered to the Spartans as representatives from the Aetolian League 
and from Philip’s ally, the Acarnanian League, each sought to persuade the Spartans to join 
their side. The Acarnanian ambassador, Lyciscus, told the Spartans that the Aetolians have 
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made an alliance with “barbarians” and that Greece faced “men of a foreign race who intend 
to enslave her.”
33
 Lyciscus encouraged the Spartans to fight for all the Greeks against a 
foreign invader, just as their ancestor Leonidas fought against Xerxes and the Persians, and 
described the violence that the Roman army has already committed in Greece.
34
 The 
authenticity of this speech, just like the speech of Agelaus, is debated. Eckstein and Walbank 
both accept the speech as historically valid.
35
 
 It has also been argued that the reference to Roman enslavement of Greeks is clear 
evidence that the speech is a later composition.
36
  Rome certainly was not interested in 
annexing territory in Greece in 211. The treaty between the Romans and the Aetolians 
described by Livy and partially preserved in an inscription makes this clear.
37
  It included the 
provision that “from the Aetolian territory as far as Corcyra, the land, dwellings, and walls 
with the fields should be the Aetolians, and all other plunder should be of the Roman 
people.”
38
  An inscription from Thyrrheum in Acarnania that is contemporary with the First 
Macedonian War supports Livy’s much later, literary version: “If the Romans capture by 
force any cities of these / peoples let it be permitted to the Aetolian people to have these 
cities and (their) territories as far as the Roman people is concerned; and [whatever] is 
captured apart from the city and its territory, / let the Romans have it.” The same 
arrangement applies to cities captured by both the Romans and Aetolians.
39
  While the 
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Romans receive booty from their victories, only the Aetolians gain territory. Livy confirms 
that this arrangement was carried out: three cities captured in 211, Oeniadae, Nasus, and 
Anticyra, were all given to the Aetolians.
40
  If Lyciscus was saying that the Romans were 
trying to conquer Greece, his point would not have been supported by the actions of the 
Republic.  Even if Polybius’ reconstruction accurately recreates the language Lyciscus used, 
Lyciscus was an Acarnanian and an ally of Philip V. Whatever Lyciscus actually said about 
Rome could have been propaganda meant to discourage Sparta from siding with the 
Republic.  
 In 209, Philip and the Aetolians met at the Conference of Aegium to discuss peace. 
The meeting was described by Livy, and a Polybian fragment of a speech by an unknown 
attendee is attributed to a speaker at this conference.
41
  Eckstein correctly points out that the 
speaker must be a Macedonian, as he prays against an Aetolian victory.
42
  The anonymous 
Macedonian says that “should the Aetolians be victorious, which Heaven forbid, the Romans 
will subjugate them as well as all the other Greeks.”
43
  The Macedonian’s speech does not 
reflect how neutral Greeks or Rome’s allies perceived the Western power. Beyond whatever 
embellishments Polybius has made, the anti-Roman elements of the speech were also 
exaggerated as a piece of Macedonian propaganda.  
 The issue of Roman conquest is raised again in another fragmentary Polybian speech 
from 207 delivered to the Aetolians, urging them to end hostilities. The name of the speaker 
is not given in the text, but he is usually thought to be a Rhodian named Thrasycrates, based 
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on a note in the margins of one of the manuscripts.
44
  The main argument of the speech is that 
the treaty the Aetolians have made with the Romans is dishonorable, as the Aetolians are 
“fighting for the enslavement and ruin of Greece.”
45
 Thrasycrates tells the Aetolians:
46
  
For it is only too evident, I think, that the Romans if they get the war in Italy 
off their hands—and this will be very shortly, as Hannibal is now confined in 
quite a small district of Bruttium—will next throw themselves with their 
whole strength on Grecian lands on the pretext that they are helping the 
Aetolians against Philip, but really with the intention of conquering the whole 
country. Should the Romans, when they have subjugated us, determine to treat 
us kindly, the credit and thanks will be theirs; but if they treat us ill it is they 
who will acquire the spoils of those they destroy and sovereignty over the 
survivors, and you will then call the gods to witness when neither any god will 
be still willing, nor any man still able to help you.  
 
 Polybius generally disapproves of complete invention of speeches, and he did usually 
strive for historical accuracy.
47
  If he reported these speeches accurately, then Lyciscus, 
Agelaus, Thrasycrates, and the Macedonian ambassador alleged that Rome was trying to 
conquer Greece long before the Republic had shown any interest in doing so. It seems 
plausible that Greeks expressed concern about a foreign army attacking Greek cities. While 
Roman troops were not making territorial gains at this point, they were taking booty and 
selling captives into slavery, which is mentioned both by Lyciscus and Thrasycrates.
48
  
Derow is incorrect to say that “Nothing like this, with populations being enslaved, had been 
seen in Greece for a long time.”
49
  When Mantinea was besieged in 223, the booty and slaves 
were worth 300 talents.
50
  Philip took 5,000 prisoners when Elis was sacked in 219 and sold 
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off “the existing inhabitants” of Thebes in 217.
51
  The numbers may not be trustworthy, but 
the exact amount is not important. The Romans were not doing anything unprecedented by 
taking large numbers of slaves. This does not mean, however, that it would not have been a 
cause for concern among Greeks. The hostility to Roman conquest in the early speeches in 
Polybius is likely to be exaggerated by the historian, but the Greeks of the late 3
rd
 century 
had reason to resent Roman involvement. 
 Eckstein uses Thrasycrates’ speech as evidence for wider anti-Roman sentiment at 
Rhodes. However Eckstein’s view rests too heavily on his understanding of this speech. This 
speech from Polybius is a later reconstruction and contains an exaggerated view of anti-
Romanism in 207.  Other interpretations are possible: for example, Berthold claims that the 
Rhodian was trying to convince the Aetolians to make peace apart from Rome, and could 
have overstated the hostility towards Rome. Berthold adds that one speech does not 
constitute a Rhodian anti-Roman policy.
52
   
 Polybius’ bias against the Aetolians may have also caused him to exaggerate Greek 
fear in these speeches. Polybius regarded the Aetolians as greedy pirates.
53
  While the 
speeches of Lyciscus, the Acarnanian, and Thrasycrates all depict the Romans unfavorably, 
by extension they also depict the Aetolians negatively, since the Aetolians were Rome’s main 
ally in this war. Besides Polybius’ hindsight from after 167, his hatred for the Aetolians 
could also have contributed to the negative portrayal of Rome in these three speeches.   
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  In using these speeches to gauge the level of resentment among the Greeks at the end 
of the 3
rd
 century, it is worth noting that the strategy of pointing out the threat from Rome 
was not successful for any of these speakers. Despite Lyciscus’ speech in 211 urging against 
it, the Spartans allied themselves with the Aetolians and Rome.
54
  In 209 the Macedonian 
speaker did not convince the Aetolians to agree to peace.
55
  Despite the urging of 
Thrasycrates in 207, the Aetolians did not make peace with Philip for nearly a year, and this 
was due mainly to lack of Roman support.
56
  Those whose interests were opposed to Rome’s 
may have emphasized the threat the Republic posed, and this would not have been 
worthwhile unless Roman involvement generated some alarm, but the response of the Greeks 
also shows that these fears were subordinated to their present concerns.   
  In sum, Polybius’s views on speech writing make it unlikely that the speeches he 
reports were complete fabrications. He used various sources for the speeches he relates, and 
one of his criteria for evaluating these sources was his own experience. During the period 
before Polybius’ life, the speeches are less reliable than later speeches in his Histories when 
he himself may have been in attendance. The historian was writing in a period when Roman 
power and authority over Hellas was indisputable. This led him to exaggerate aspects of his 
sources that discussed Roman imperialism. The four speeches examined here all discuss 
Roman subjugation of the Greeks. Although Rome showed through its actions that conquest 
was not its goal at this point, Roman behavior in war would still have generated some 
anxiety. It is likely that there is some element of historicity in all of these four speeches, but 
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the threat from Rome was not serious enough for the Spartans in 211, nor for the Aetolians in 
209 and 207, to take steps to prevent Roman intervention. 
 
The Second Macedonian War 
 The First Macedonian War ended in 205 with the Peace of Phoenice. After a few 
years of calm, another war in the East broke out between Philip and Rome. At a conference 
of the Aetolian League in 199 delegates from Macedonia, Rome, and Athens (then a Roman 
ally) each presented arguments to the Aetolians regarding what side to take.
57
  In Livy’s 
reconstruction, the Macedonian envoy appeals to the peace treaty the Aetolians made with 
Philip in 206, and points out that the Romans ignored Aetolian requests for help a few years 
earlier. He then describes how the Romans claimed to be aiding Messana and Syracuse, two 
Greek cities, when they went to Sicily, and now they control the island. He presents the 
Aetolians’ circumstances as the same as the Sicilians.
58
  As in the earlier speeches in 
Polybius, the Romans are referred to as barbarians. The Macedonian says that “with foreign 
people, with barbarians, all Greeks have and will have an eternal war. For they are enemies 
not by causes that change day by day, but by nature, which is everlasting.”
59
  
 The Athenian envoy is the second to speak. He lists the injuries that Philip has 
inflicted on Athens. Destruction and slavery imposed during war is acceptable, but Philip has 
exceeded this and committed numerous crimes against the gods.
60
   Philip attacked their 
sanctuaries, and Rome came to fight against Philip, implying that Rome saves even the gods 
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themselves and the Aetolians should take the side of the Romans. The Roman ambassador, 
Lucius Furius Purpurio, defends Roman action against the criticism of the Macedonian. He 
does not deny that Sicily is under Roman control. Instead he claims that “the fortune of each 
people is according to its service towards us.” 
61
  The Roman then attacks Philip’s character 
and says that the Romans entered the first war with Philip for the sake of the Aetolians. He 
closes by offering to restore the friendship between the Romans and Aetolians. According to 
Livy, the Aetolians were leaning in favor of the Romans, but the chief magistrate 
Damocritus, who was bribed by Philip, convinces them to put off making a decision until 
later. Eventually, the Aetolians side with Rome after a Roman victory at Ottobulum and an 
increase in Roman naval strength.
62
 
 Polybius’ account of this conference is lost, but it is likely that Livy used Polybius as 
his source for these speeches.
63
  Where direct comparison is possible, there are no incidents 
where Livy included a speech where Polybius does not.
64
  Livy’s speeches were not 
translations of those in Polybius, however. Livy often rearranged the order of speeches, paid 
more attention to emotions and psychology, and adjusted the lengths of various speeches.
65
  
For example, both Polybius and Livy discussed a meeting between Antiochus III of Syria and 
Roman commissioners in 196.
66
  Livy expanded the speech of the Romans, shortened the 
speech of Antiochus, and rearranged the points Antiochus made in his speech, while covering 
the same material as Polybius.
67
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 Whatever the Athenian envoy to the Aetolians said about Rome in 199, or at least 
what the Athenian said in Polybius’ reconstruction, it is likely that Livy’s patriotism led him 
to exaggerate Rome’s role as defender of Greece. The Macedonian appeal to Panhellenism is 
similar to other appeals made by speakers throughout Polybius, and it is likely that the Greek 
historian included the concept of Greek unity against a foreign power.
68
  This does not mean 
that this idea was added by Polybius, only that it was not added by Livy.  
 There is no reason to believe Livy’s comment that Damocritus was bribed by Philip, 
but the Aetolian response to these speeches is important. The Aetolians did not decide on 
with whom to ally themselves until Rome appeared stronger.
69
  This could have been through 
fear of the Roman ambassadors justification for Roman treatment of Sicily—that Rome 
treated other peoples based on their services to Rome—or it could have been due to the 
Aetolian desire for certain areas in Greece.
70
   The two motivations are not entirely separate. 
The Aetolians sided with whom they thought would win.
71
 Although the Aetolians may have 
been motivated by a desire for conquest themselves, the Roman justification for the treatment 
of Sicily could not have reduced fears of Rome among Greeks.  When the Macedonian 
suggested that the Aetolians’ situation was like that of the Sicilians, the Roman ambassador 
implied that, if the Aetolians should disfavor Rome like the Sicilians, they would suffer the 
same fate. 
 In 198, the other major federal League in Greece, the Achaean League, defected from 
Philip and joined the Romans. Before the Achaeans made this decision, ambassadors where 
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sent by the Romans, Rhodians, King Attalus of Pergamum, the Athenians, and the 
Macedonians. At Sicyon, a council was held to determine what the Achaeans should do. 
According to Livy, there was a great confusion among the Achaeans both before and after the 
ambassadors spoke.
72
  In Livy’s version, the Achaean chief magistrate Aristaenus delivers a 
speech urging the Achaeans to side with Rome. Aristaenus stresses the strength of the Roman 
forces in Greece. He refers to the Achaean conflict with Nabis of Sparta, in which Philip had 
not assisted them. There is also a long list of Philip’s crimes that Aristaenus says he will 
leave aside. After Aristaenus’ speech, the Achaeans approve a treaty with the Rhodians and 
with Attalus and decide that they would also make an alliance with Rome. Three members of 
the league, the Dymaei, the Megalopolitans, and the Argives—all loyal to Macedonia
73
 –, 
storm out of the conference when this was put to a vote.
74
  
The meeting at Sicyon was held after Rome had offered to restore Corinth to the 
Achaeans, although Aristaenus does not mention this in his speech.
75
  As with the Aetolian 
alliance with Rome, the issues involved  in the Achaean decision were Greek acquisition of 
land and the strength of Roman forces, although fear of Nabis of Sparta was also relevant.
76
  
It is likely that Livy’s version of this speech was based on a version related by Polybius.
77
  
Gruen stresses the Achaean desire for Peloponnesian hegemony with the acquisition of 
Corinth and Roman support against Nabis of Sparta, while Eckstein emphasizes fear of 
Rome, but also thinks that Polybius (and therefore Livy) downplayed Rome’s promise of 
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Corinth because of his patriotism.
78
  The destruction of Greek towns by Flamininus would 




Eckstein is correct that the offer of Corinth was suppressed by Polybius in order to 
defend his native Achaean League. If Polybius’ Aristaenus mentioned this, Livy would not 
have missed an opportunity to demonstrate Roman generosity.
80
  Polybius’ version of this 
speech could have served as a defense of his native Achaean League against accusations that 
they violated their oaths to Philip for the sake of territorial gain.
81
  Polybius may have been 
trying to show that it was necessary for the Achaeans to join Rome in the interest of self-
preservation, a claim he states explicitly elsewhere.
82
  Livy’s speech of Aristaenus is also 
consistent with the philosophy that Polybius attributes to Aristaenus with regard to Rome. 
Polybius says that Aristaenus’ view of Greek relations with Rome was that a state should 
strive to do what is honorable when it is possible, but when people are powerless, they must 
do what is in their best interest.
83
  Polybius includes this at a later point in his History, and 
this may reflect slightly different historical circumstances, but the same principle is evident 
in the speech in Livy.    
It is impossible to know for certain how prominently the promise of Corinth featured 
in the Achaean decision to abandon Philip or in the speech Aristaenus actually delivered. 
While Polybius claimed to report what was actually said, he was also prone to showing 
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favoritism for his native Achaean League.
84
  It is likely that the acquisition of Corinth was 
one of the factors involved in the Achaeans’ decision: the Achaeans did not side with Rome 
until after Flamininus made the offer. However, the position that Aristaenus takes in Livy is 
consistent with his views on international politics elsewhere, and the speech is probably not a 
complete fabrication by Polybius.
85
 The concern with the threat posed by Rome that appears 
in Livy was probably in Aristaenus’ historical speech.  
During the Second Macedonian War, both main Leagues in Greece sided with Rome. 
Although not always explicit, the same theme was present in both decisions. Rome rewarded 
its friends and punished its enemies.  When the strength of Rome’s forces convinced the 
Greeks that the Republic would be able to enforce its will, both the Aetolians and Achaeans 
preferred to be rewarded rather than punished. The Aetolians did not side with Rome until 
the Western power appeared to be winning the war, and the Achaeans did not side with 
Rome until they were promised territorial gain. Both motivations were important to Greek 
views of Rome, but in the speeches from this period, the Roman threat is the dominant 
theme.    
  
   After the Isthmian Declaration 
 After the end of the Second Macedonian War and the famous declaration of Greek 
freedom, Flamininus remained in Greece to ensure the post war settlement was carried out 
and possibly to defend Roman interests should conflict break out between Rome and 
Antiochus III of Syria. When Roman legates reported to the senate that there was a threat 
from Nabis of Sparta, the Senate did not declare war but decided to let Flamininus decide 
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  After Nabis took control of Argos, Flamininus held a meeting with Greek 
representatives at Corinth, where he asked the Greeks what they wanted Rome to do.  
 In Livy’s version of the meeting, Flamininus tells the Greeks that Nabis’ hold on 
Sparta would be no concern to Rome except that the enslavement of Argos violates the 
Roman declaration of Greek freedom.
87
  The representative from Athens  praises Roman 
service to Greece, but the Aetolian representative presents the Isthmian Declaration as a 
sham, as Roman forces held Chalcis and Demetrias, two of the “Fetters of Greece” 
previously held by Philip.
88
  The Aetolians will deal with Nabis; Rome can remove its 
legions from Greece. Aristaenus responds on behalf of the Achaeans, saying that the 
Aetolians “have only the language of Greeks, as they have only the shape of humans.”
89
  He 
then asks the Romans to save Argos from Sparta and to keep the rest of the Greeks safe from 
the Aetolians. The Greeks decide on war with Sparta.  
Livy says that besides the Aetolians the representatives were generally in favor of 
Roman involvement.
90
   Flamininus’ speech was part of a larger propaganda campaign meant 
to ensure support among Greeks. Whatever Rome’s actual motivation for the war, most of 
the Greeks supported the Roman war on Sparta.
91
  Livy’s version was probably based on 
Polybius, although the admiration of Flamininus is likely an addition of Livy.
92
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 After the Second Macedonian War, Roman propaganda in Greece stressed Rome’s 
role as liberator. This perception of Rome would change over the next decade. In 184, 
Appius Claudius, a member of a Roman delegation sent to Greece, appeared before a council 
of the Achaean League in response to complaints that the Achaeans had mistreated the 
Spartans. Lycortas, Polybius’ father, delivered a speech addressing the accusations against 
the Achaeans. In Livy’s version of the speech, Lycortas opens by saying that it is unfair that 
the Achaeans must defend themselves to a Roman against a charge raised against them by a 
Roman.
93
  Lycortas addresses the crimes that Achaeans allegedly committed against the 
Spartans, but he ends his speech with a discussion of Roman power.  Lycortas says his 
speech is one “of slaves disputing with their masters.”
94
  The treaty that the Romans had with 
the Achaeans is presented as one of equals, but “in reality, for the Achaeans there is a 
freedom obtained by begging, and for the Romans there is dominance.”
95
  Appius Claudius 
responds that the Achaeans should solve the problem on their own before they are forced to 
do so against their will.
96
 
 Four years later, controversy again arose between Sparta and the Achaeans, and the 
Achaeans sent representatives to Rome. In Polybius’ version of the embassy, Callicrates tells 
the Romans that all Greek states were divided between those who thought that the Greeks 
should always give in to Roman demands and those who thought that previous treaties and 
laws  should still be followed.
97
  Callicrates then tells the Senate if they want the Achaeans to 
stop ignoring their demands, they should make this issue a priority. Polybius says that after 
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this speech by Callicrates, the Romans began to intentionally put their supporters in power in 
Greece and to remove their detractors from power.
98
  Callicrates was eventually responsible 
for Polybius’ exile, and it is likely that Polybius is placing too much of the blame for 
Greece’s downfall on his political rival. However, Callicrates’ speech must have had an 
effect on the Romans, since the Senate wrote to the Achaeans, Aetolians, Epirots, Athenians, 




 The speeches by Lycortas and Callicrates represent a more submissive attitude of the 
Achaeans toward Rome than the one displayed in 195. Although the Aetolians objected to 
Rome’s presence in the war with Nabis, the Achaean Aristaenus was in favor of Roman 
intervention, and Flamininus offered the Greeks the decision on the war. This may have been 
a mere formality, but even this formality would fade away in the next decade. In 195, 
Flamininus asked the Greeks what they wished him to do. After the defeat of Philip V and 
the Isthmian Declaration, Rome tried to cultivate an image as the savior of Greece. In 184, 
Appius Claudius told the Greeks that if they did not resolve their conflicts, they would not 
have a choice in the matter. Besides the Aetolians, who were dissatisfied because Rome had 
not granted them territory that thought they deserved, many Greeks had a favorable view 
towards Rome in 196, but this image had largely disappeared by 184 when Appius Claudius 
spoke to Lycortas.   
 Speeches are a major component of ancient historiography. They give the characters 
more depth, and provide the author an opportunity to explain the motives and causes behind 
historical events. For Polybius, a speech in a historical work should recreate what the speaker 
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actually said. Polybius determined what was actually said through examining documents, 
interviewing witnesses, but most importantly through personal experience. Livy was also 
dependent on his sources for speeches. When Livy follows Polybius, he does not invent 
speeches that Polybius does not report. Livy was more interested in literary style and emotion 
than Polybius, and Livy’s speeches are not always verbatim replications of his source. Both 
authors have biases for their homeland: Polybius defends the Achaean League and criticizes 
the Aetolians, and Livy suppresses information damaging to Rome’s reputation.  
 Despite these shortcomings the speeches in both their works provide insight into 
Greek perception of Rome during the period of the Macedonian Wars. During the first 
Macedonian War, three speakers discussed a threat from Rome: Lyciscus (211), an unnamed 
Macedonian (209), and Thrasycrates (207). Fear of a Roman threat to Greece was present in 
these speeches, but two of these speakers were enemies of Rome trying to tarnish the 
Republic’s reputation. A Roman threat was not serious enough for the Aetolians to 
disassociate with Rome, and it did not deter the Spartans from joining with the Aetolians and 
the Romans. Roman involvement in the East during the Second Macedonian War was 
significantly greater than during the First. The threat posed by Roman forces in Greece and 
the rewards that could be gained by siding with the winner were used to encourage both the 
Aetolians and the Achaeans to side with Rome. After winning the war and proclaiming 
Greek freedom, the Romans sought to be viewed as the saviors of Greece. Eventually many 
Greeks began to view their relationship with Rome as it was expressed by Lycortas, as slaves 






CHAPTER TWO: ROME AS LIBERATOR 
 
 
 Roman intervention in the East from around 217 to 167 was sometimes viewed by 
Greeks as a liberating force. This view of the western power was due to Rome’s limited 
involvement in Greece, Roman propaganda, and the competition Rome created for other 
imperialist powers like Philip and Antiochus. Rome’s commitment to the First Macedonian 
War was small, and even after Antiochus’ defeat Rome often avoided exerting control in 
Greece. Rome’s hesitancy to take control was recognized by Greeks who ignored Rome’s 
requests.  
 Romans also tried to gather support among the Greeks by portraying themselves as 
liberators. The Isthmian Declaration, a letter from Flamininus to the people of Chyretiae, and 
Flamininus’ offering to the temple of Apollo at Delphi are all examples of Roman 
propaganda. Rome could make the claim to be restoring the freedom of the Greeks because 
Roman aid was often the best hope the Greeks had for a defense against other imperialist 
powers.  The alliance between Philip and Antiochus at the end of the 3
rd
 century posed a 
threat to the entire balance of power in the Mediterranean. Philip’s violent behavior caused 
some Greeks, like the poet Alcaeus of Messene, to rejoice in his downfall. Greek cities in 
Asia Minor, like Smyrna, saw Rome as a counter-point to threats from Antiochus and made 
dedications to Rome as a way to seek Roman support or express their gratitude. Rome also 
relieved Greeks from imperialism of other Greeks, such as when Rome liberated Delphi from 
the Aetolians. Since Rome often did not exercise control in Greek affairs and presented itself 




The Limits of Roman Involvement 
 Rome’s presence in the East was often restrained or non-committal. Rome’s 
investment in the First Macedonian War was small. After defeating Philip, Rome did not 
impose typical forms of control, like permanent garrisons, on the Greeks. When Rome had 
defeated Antiochus, the Republic rarely enforced its decisions, which Greeks often ignored.  
 Mediation attempts by neutral Greek states in the First Macedonian War have been 
viewed as attempts to keep Rome out of Greece. This misrepresents the goals of the neutral 
states, however, which aimed their peace talks at Philip and the Aetolians because Rome was 
not considered one of the main combatants. Such mediation attempts occurred in 209 at 
Phalara and Aegium, in 208 at Elateia, and possibly in 207 at two Panaetolian assemblies.
1
   
The nature of these mediations has generated significant interest among modern scholars. 
The focus of debate is whether the talks were aimed at a peace treaty between the Aetolian 
League and Philip V, or a “comprehensive peace,” which would have included Rome.
2
  
Eckstein stresses that the goals of the neutral Greeks often conflicted with Roman interests, 
since Rome wanted the war in the East to continue as it would keep Philip from invading 
Italy. He adds that the conflict between the mediators’ and Rome’s interests was a conscious 
policy on behalf of the Greek mediators.
3
  Eckstein bases this inference in part on the 
hostility toward Rome voiced in the speeches from this period in Polybius. Dmitriev goes 
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further and says that “the peace between Philip and the Aetolians was supposed to establish 




  There is no doubt that the actions of Rome in the East during the First Macedonian 
War distressed the Greeks. Still, Roman involvement in the First Macedonian War was 
actually minimal. Rome did not annex any territory, as the inscription of the Roman-Aetolian 
treaty shows.
5
 The Aetolians were nearly forced to make peace in 209 because of a lack of 
support from Rome.
6
  The Aetolians did eventually make peace with Philip but only after 
Roman troops had been inactive in Greece in 207 and 206.
7
  The war was referred to by 
contemporaries as “the Aetolian War,” which underscores the prominence of the Greek 
league in the conflict.
8
   
 A closer look at the efforts of the neutral Greeks show that they focused their 
mediation attempts on the Aetolians and Philip because they were the two main competitors 
in the war. Eckstein places too much emphasis on the speeches from this period, and 
misreads an important passage in Livy, which causes him to exaggerate Greek hostility 
toward Rome. Dmitriev is incorrect to say that one of the purposes of these mediations was 
to keep Greeks safe from Rome. Although the First Macedonian War is now viewed as the 
first in a long string of Roman wars in the East which resulted in Roman domination of 
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Hellas, to the Greeks at the time it was a conflict between Philip V and the Aetolian League. 




 The first of these mediation attempts occurred at Phalara in 209. Livy’s version is the 
only account that remains. After Philip defeated an allied force of Aetolian, Roman, and 
Pergamene troops at Lamia, he proceeded to Phalara. 
10
 
 There envoys from Ptolemy king of Egypt, the Rhodians, the Athenians, and 
Chians came for the purpose of ending the war between Philip and the 
Aetolians.  Amynander, king of the Athamanians, was invited by the 
Aetolians from the neighboring lands as an arbitrator. Moreover, all of them 
were not so much concerned for the Aetolians, a more violent people than is 
in the nature of Greeks, as that Philip and his power, which would be 
burdensome to their liberty, not mix with Greek affairs. The deliberation 
concerning peace was delayed until the council of the Achaeans, and for that 
council a location and a certain date was set. Meanwhile, a cessation of 
hostilities of thirty days was obtained.  
 
 Dmitriev includes this conference in a list of mediation attempts where Greek 
representatives emphasized that the Greeks were being enslaved by the Romans.
11
  However, 
the Romans are mentioned nowhere in Livy’s account of this conference. Dmitriev has 
extended his conclusions about other peace talks to include this one, although the text does 
not support it. Instead Livy says that fear of Philip motivated the Greeks.  It is true that Livy 
could have suppressed information that would seem damaging to Rome’s image, but this 
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 A few months later, Philip met with the Achaean League at Aegium.
13
  The Aetolians 
and the neutral Greeks from Phalara also came and discussed ending the war. Negotiations 
were unsuccessful after the Aetolians made excessive demands to Philip, who was in a more 
powerful position at the time. Livy says that Philip:
14
   
proceeded to Aegium to a meeting of his allies which was called long ago. 
There the issue of ending the Aetolian war was treated, so there would be no 
cause either for the Romans or for Attalus to enter Greece. But when the 
length of the armistice was nearly spent, the Aetolians overthrew all this after 
they heard that Attalus had come to Aegina and a Roman fleet lie at 
Naupactus. For when they were called to the Achaean council, where the 
ambassadors also were who had dealt with the issue of peace at Phalara, the 
Aetolians at first complained about certain small deeds done contrary to the 
promise of their arrangement during the period of the truce. Then they said 
that the war could be not stopped unless the Achaeans returned Pylus to the 
Messenians, Atintania was restored to the Romans, and the Ardiaei were 
restored to Scerdilaedus and Pleuratus. Philip on the other hand, having 
thought it disgraceful for the conquered voluntarily to give conditions to him, 
the victor, said that not even formerly had he heard the discussion of peace or 
had he fixed the truce having any hope that the Aetolians would remain at 
peace, but so that he would have all his allies as witnesses that he sought an 
occasion for peace, while the Aetolians sought one for war. And so, with 
peace unaccomplished he dismissed the council. 
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 Livy said that peace was discussed “so there would be no cause either for the Romans 
or for Attalus to enter Greece.”
15
   Eckstein thinks that this phrase refers to a public 
proclamation of the intent of the mediators. 
16
  He claims that the phrase must refer to the 
general purpose of the conference, which would have been determined by the mediators. 
However, it is not clear from Livy’s account that this phrase was a public statement, or that it 
was a “proclamation of the general purpose of the peace conference.”
17
 When Livy makes 
this statement, he has not yet mentioned any mediators. He has just spoken of Philip’s 
meeting with his allies.   
  Livy, Polybius, or Polybius’ sources could be responsible for attributing this 
motivation to Philip and his allies. In the context of Philip’s recent victories, this motivation 
would have been a reasonable interpretation for either of the ancient historians. Philip says at 
the conference that the Aetolians were not in a position to make demands due to their recent 
defeats. Philip and his allies would have wanted to bring an end to the war before additional 
reinforcements arrived from Rome or Attalus. This interpretation is reinforced by the events 
that followed. When Roman and Pergamene forces did arrive, the Aetolians gained 
confidence in their position and made demands that Philip deemed excessive.
18
  This is 
exactly what Philip and his allies were trying to avoid by seeking peace before Rome and 
Attalus arrived.  
 Appian (95 A.D.- 160’s), an Alexandrian historian of the 2
nd
 century A.D., records 
two other mediation attempts from the year 207. According to Appian, during the first 
attempt neutral Greeks attempted to convince the Aetolians, Philip, and the Romans to agree 
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to peace. Sulpicius Galba, proconsul in 207, was instructed by the Senate to refuse to agree to 
terms.
19
  Rome then sent reinforcements to Greece and helped the Aetolians capture 
Ambracia. There was then a second mediation attempt. During these peace talks, the neutral 
Greeks said that the Aetolians were forcing servitude on the Greeks by allying themselves 
with Rome. When Galba tried to reply, the audience shouted at him.  
  Appian’s later account should be rejected. The Alexandrian historian’s record of the 
Roman expedition to take Ambracia was not mentioned by either Polybius or Livy, and it 
conflicts with the earlier historians’ account of Roman inactivity in 207.
20
  There are other 
incidents where Appian described events which did not happen. He says that Philip captured 
Chios in 201, although this did not occur.
21
  The Alexandrian historian also describes an 
incident in 167 where Prusias, king of Bithynia, asked the Romans to forgive him for being 
neutral in the Third Macedonian War. However, Prusias did not remain neutral in this war, 
and gave Rome five ships.
22
 Appian’s information on the period of the Macedonian Wars 
often was erroneous.  
  Despite the difficulties Appian’s narrative presents, Eckstein does not see this as 
grounds to dismiss it completely. He suggests that either Appian was confused, or he was 
working with a Roman tradition that invented Galba’s expedition to defend Rome against the 
charge of abandoning the Aetolians. Eckstein argues that the peace conferences which 
Appian reports before and after Galba’s expedition should be accepted because the second 
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attempt to affect a peace treaty provides a context for Thrasycrates’ speech from Polybius 
11.4-6. 
23
   
 Even if Appian’s account does describe the same incident as Polybius 11.4-6, this still 
does not provide adequate evidence of anti-Roman policy from neutral Greeks. If 
Thrasycrates delivered his speech at Appian’s second mediation attempt, it is possible that 
Polybius was the ultimate source. Appian could have combined Polybius with a Roman 
source, or the Roman source could have drawn on Polybius. The Alexandrian cites Polybius 
in another circumstance, but he may not have directly read Polybius. Instead he may have 
read an intermediary source.
24
  If this episode does come from Polybius, the hostility in the 
ambassador’s speeches would be subject to the same criticism as Thrasycrates’ speech: it 
reflects Polybius hindsight after 167 and his bias against the Aetolian League. Regardless of 
the source, the Rhodians could have exaggerated the Roman threat to convince the Aetolians 
to agree to a separate peace, and one speech, tentatively attributed to a Rhodian, is not 
adequate evidence of a Rhodian anti-Roman policy.
25
  Eckstein also underplays the fact that 
the ambassadors included the Romans in the first mediation attempt, apparently with no 
hostility.   
 Eckstein’s view of these mediation attempts is correct to the extent that he claims that 
the main goal of the mediators was to achieve peace between Philip and the Aetolians, but he 
places too great an emphasis on the language of Polybius’ speeches. Dmitriev’s claim that 
neutral Greeks were deliberately trying to keep Rome out of Greece misrepresents the 
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intention of the Greek mediators, since Roman presence in the East during these years was 
actually minimal.   
 Even after the First Macedonian War, as Romans became more involved in Greek 
affairs, they rarely exercised direct control over Greeks. Except for installing garrisons in 
Demetrias, Chalcis and Acrocorinth for three years after Cynoscephalae, Rome did not annex 
territory, install governors, or establish colonies in the East.
26
  Even after Rome had defeated 
the two most powerful Hellenistic kings, Roman rulings on Greek affairs were still 
sometimes indecisive. For example, in 189, after Sparta had attacked a city inhabited by 
Spartan exiles, the Achaeans demanded that Sparta surrender those who were responsible for 
the attack. In response, the city of Sparta tried to break away from the Achaean League by 
surrendering to the Roman consul M. Fulvius Nobilior.
27
  The Lacedaemonians and the 
Achaeans both sent ambassadors to Rome. Rome’s decision was that there should be no 
change concerning the Spartans.
28
  The response was so vaguely worded that both sides 
interpreted it in their favor. 
 When Rome did issue direct commands, Greeks sometimes felt free to ignore them. 
In 181, the Senate sent a letter to the Achaeans telling them to allow Spartan exiles to return 
to their city, but the Achaeans ignored this ruling.
29
  In 178, the Lycians sent an embassy to 
Rome to ask for aid against Rhodian oppression.
30
  The Romans sent envoys to the Rhodians 
saying that they were not to regard the Lycians as their slaves but as their allies.
31
  The 
Rhodians sent envoys to Rome to contest this decision, which the Romans avoided 
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answering. Soon after this the Rhodians and Lycians waged war against each other, and Livy 
recorded no response from Rome.
32
  At least in some instances, the Greeks thought they 
could ignore Roman demands and not suffer negative consequences. 
 
Roman Propaganda and the Slogan of Freedom 
 
 Rome’s tendency to avoid taking direct control in Greece reinforced its claim to be 
fighting for Greek independence. From the beginning of the Second Macedonian War, Rome 
demanded that Philip not attack the Greeks. After Cynoscephalae, Flamininus proclaimed 
Rome’s gift of freedom to the Greeks at Corinth in 196, in his dedication at Delphi, and in a 
letter he wrote to the people of Chyretiae.  
 In the beginning of the Second Macedonian War, Roman demands against Philip 
depicted Rome as fighting on behalf of the Greeks.  In 200, Roman messengers told Philip 
“to make war on no Grecian state…If he acted so, they added, he might consider himself at 
peace with Rome, but if he refused to accede the consequences would be the reverse.”
33
  Two 
years later, Flamininus ordered “that Philip should withdraw from the whole of Greece after 
giving up to each power the prisoners and deserters in his hands.” 
34
  Although there is no 
mention of Greek freedom, Romans still are speaking of protecting Greece from Philip’s 
aggression.  
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 The demands made to Philip in 200 and 198 led to Roman propaganda of Greek 
freedom. The first appearance of this slogan of freedom was the senatorial decree that ended 
the Second Macedonian War.  The contents of the decree included that:
35
 
All the rest of the Greeks in Asia and Europe were to be free and subject to 
their own laws; Philip was to surrender to the Romans before the Isthmian 
Games those Greeks subject to his rule and the cities in which he had 
garrisons; he was to leave free, withdrawing his garrisons from them, the 
towns of Euromus, Pedasa, Bargylia, and Iasus, as well as Abydus, Thasos, 
Myrina, and Perinthus; Flamininus was to write to Prusias in the terms of the 
senatus consultum about restoring the freedom of Cius; Philip was to restore 
to the Romans all prisoners of war and deserters before the same date, and to 
surrender to them all his warships with the exception of five light vessels and 
his great “sixteen”; he was to pay them one thousand talents, half at once, and 
the other half by installments extending over ten years. 
 
Polybius does not claim to recreate the senatorial decree, but he may have had access to a 
Roman copy of the document.
36
  Prior to Cynoscephalae, the Romans had not used the notion 
of freedom in their dealings in the East, but various Greek states did present their war efforts 
as a fight for their own freedom. 
37
  For example, the Greek envoys to the Senate in 198 and 
King Amynander of the Athamanians asked Rome to limit Philip’s power in the post-war 
settlement, because of the threat he posed to their freedom.
38
   
 Rome’s Greek allies may have suggested the use of this slogan, and the Romans 
adapted their practices to a Greek context by using propaganda based on earlier precedents 
throughout Greek history.
39
  The practice of declaring Greeks free to garner support had 
Hellenistic precedents going back at least to 318, when the Macedonian regent Polyperchon 
tried to gather Greek support against Cassander and Antigonus Monophthalmus.  Similar 
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language was used by the Ptolemies and Seleucids throughout the third century.
 40
  In 
contrast, it appears that prior to the Second Macedonian War the Romans rarely used the 
notion of libertas in their interstate relations.
41
  The Roman use of the slogan of Greek 
freedom may have been a Roman attempt to adopt Hellenic forms of international relations.   
 With the war against Philip brought to a close, Rome looked to the next major threat: 
Antiochus III of Syria. Flamininus became a spokesperson for the Roman policy of gathering 
Greek support to create a buffer zone between Italy and Syria.
 42
 Polybius reports that at the 




the senate of Rome and Titus Quinctius the proconsul having overcome King 
Philip and the Macedonians, leave the following peoples free, without 
garrisons, and subject to no tribute and governed by their own countries’ 
laws—the Corinthians, Phocians, Locrians, Euboeans, Phthiotic Achaeans, 
Magnesians, Thessalians, and Perrhaebians.  
 
Polybius, Livy, and Plutarch all report loud shouts of joy from the Greek audience, and 
honors heaped on Flamininus for making the declaration. 
44
  Flamininus also made a 
dedication at Delphi in which he said that “Titus, a descendant of Aeneas,   has brought you a 
most excellent gift, he who for the sons of the Greeks wrought freedom.”
45
  Although Roman 
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 Flamininus’ policy is further documented by an inscription from Chyretiae dating to 
around 194, preserved on a white marble stone in the wall of a church in Thessaly.
47
  The 
inscription records a letter of Flamininus to the people of Chyretiae, in which Flamininus 
returned land previously under Roman control to the Greek people. The land had probably 
been under Roman control since the Aetolians sacked the city in 199.
48
  In the letter, 
Flamininus says that he was demonstrating the favorable policy of the Romans to the 
Chyretiaeans, and that the Romans “favor above all else good will and a good name.”
49
  
Flamininus also included a subtle criticism of the Aetolians, by saying that his purpose was 
to show that Rome would not accept censure from those who do not act properly 
themselves.
50




  Eckstein sees this as an example of Flamininus interfering in Greek affairs contrary 
to the Isthmian Declaration.
52
  However, as Walsh and Armstrong argue, property 
restorations did not depend on political affiliations, only on legal property rights.
53
  
Flamininus’ actions did not support any specific political party, and he did not take away 
land from anti-Roman Greeks. Instead he demonstrated that Greek freedom was genuine by 
returning land to people who had fought against Rome. As with the Isthmian Declaration and 
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the removal of Roman troops, this letter represents one more attempt by Flamininus to stress 
Rome’s benevolence towards the Greeks before he returned westward.  
 
Roman Assistance and Greek Gratitude 
 Roman propaganda of Greek freedom resulted from Greek attempts to solicit Roman 
aid. Numerous Greek envoys were sent to the Senate. The Republics actions frequently 
benefitted Greeks, and Greeks responded with praise and thanks.  These expressions of 
gratitude took the form of poems, religious dedications, and honorific inscriptions, and they 
confirm that many Greeks viewed Rome’s declaration of freedom as genuine.  
 Rome entered the Second Macedonian War after numerous Greek states sent envoys 
to Rome seeking aid. According to Polybius, after Ptolemy Philopator died and was 
succeeded by his very young son, Philip and Antiochus made an alliance to take control of 
Ptolemaic possessions. This created a threat to the Greek world that the various Greek city-
states and Leagues could not fight on their own. In 201, Attalus of Pergamum and Rhodes 
sent to Rome for help in their war against Philip.
54
  Egypt sent ambassadors to Rome looking 
for protection from Philip and Antiochus.
55
 Athens sent three embassies to Romans. When 
Athens was besieged by Macedonian forces in 201, the Athenians sent a request for Roman 
aid, and a sent a second in early 200.
56
  Finally, in autumn of 200, Athenian envoys asking 
for Roman help met Publius Sulpicius Galba when he arrived across the Adriatic.
57
  The 
Aetolian League may also have asked Rome for help against Philip, although the historicity 
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of this is less firmly established.
58
  When the second war with Philip was winding to a close, 
already Greeks in Asia Minor began soliciting Roman aid against Antiochus. Smyrna, 
Lampascus, and Alexandria Troas appealed to Rome in 197.
59
  These embassies at least 
suggest that these Greek states considered increased Roman presence in the East to be in 
their best interest.  
 The appeals for Roman aid from the Rhodians, Egyptians, and Athenians also 
reinforce the conclusion that mediating states in the First Macedonian War were not 
concerned with a threat from Rome. These three states were among the neutral Greeks 
seeking to end the First Macedonian War. Eckstein sees the appeals for help in 201 and 200 
as a dramatic turn from earlier attempts by these Greeks to arrange a peace treaty in the First 
Macedonian War, which was contrary to Rome’s purpose. It is true that such mediation 
attempts were contrary to Rome’s goals, but the embassies in 201 and 200 do not represent as 
dramatic a turn in Greek attitudes as Eckstein suggests.
60
 As Eckstein himself admits, besides 
the issue of the peace talks, Roman relations with Egypt and Athens had been friendly, 
although distant.
61
  In the First Macedonian War, Rome’s refusal to take land could have 
demonstrated to the Greeks that the Republic was not a major threat to them. Instead, the 
Greeks could hope that the Romans would see the threat posed by Philip and Antiochus and 
provide assistance without subjugating Greece themselves.  
 Once Rome had become the dominant power in the East, attempts to solicit Roman 
aid were phrased by Greeks as surrender. Rome was viewed as the best alternative to the 
imperialist aggression of other eastern powers, like Antiochus, or the Achaean League. In 
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192, when Achaean expansion threatened Messene, the Messenians offered to surrender 
themselves to Flamininus, in hopes of protection.
62
  When the Achaeans sided with Spartan 
exiles against Sparta, the Spartans surrendered to Fulvius Nobilior for the same reason.
63
  
 An inscription of a letter of Lucius Cornelius Scipio dating to 190 records a similar 
incident with Heraclea-ad-Latmos.
64
  When the Roman army arrived in Asia Minor under 
Scipio, the Heracleans surrendered to the Romans.
65
  Scipio then sent a letter to the 
Heracleans, accepting the surrender and telling them “to you, just as to all the other cities 
which have placed themselves in our care, we grant freedom, with the right to administer all 
your own affairs yourselves, under your own laws.”
66
   Greek states in Western Asia Minor 
which were taken by Antiochus were often subject to imperial garrisons, governors, and 
taxation.
67
 When Greeks like the Heracleans were forced to choose between Rome and other 
threats, such as Antiochus, the possibility of freedom made Rome the more tolerable choice.  
 Besides asking for Roman assistance, Greeks also expressed gratitude towards Rome 
when the Republic’s actions worked to their advantage.  The Greek poet Alcaeus of Messene, 
who published during the Second Macedonian War, is one example of a Greek who saw the 
Roman victory as resulting in Greek freedom. Alcaeus’ poems are preserved in the Greek 
Anthology: a collection of Greek poetry compiled by the Byzantine Greek Cephalas (912-59 
AD) from the earlier collections of Meleager (c. 90 BC), Philippus (c. 40 AD), and Agathias 
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  One of Alcaeus’ twenty-two remaining epigrams praises Titus Quinctius 
Flamininus for liberating Greece:  
Both Xerxes led a Persian host to the land of Hellas,  
 and Titus, too, led there a host from broad  Italy, 
 But the one meant to set the yoke of slavery on the neck of Europe,  




Xerxes was the Persian king against whom 31 Greek states had fought in the Persian Wars in 
480 and 479. By comparing Xerxes with Flamininus, Alcaeus depicted the Roman proconsul 
as a barbarian. However, he also contrasted Flamininus with that most important enemy in 
the Greek historical memory by saying that Xerxes tried to enslave Greece, while Flamininus 
tried to free it.  
 Hostility toward Philip in Alcaeus’ other epigrams and Philip’s aggression against 
Alcaeus’ home Messene suggest that the poet’s praise of Flamininus was probably genuine.  
Few Messenians would have supported Philip after his actions in 215, when the king 
encouraged a revolt which resulted in the deaths of over 200 Messenian officials.
70
  The 
following year, Philip was unable to take the city, so he ravaged the Messenian countryside.
71
  
When Roman forces came to Greece in 211, Messene was one of the Greek states that sided 
with them against Philip.  
 In another of Alcaeus’ epigrams, the author calls Philip a murderer and wishes he 
could smash the king’s skull:  
    
I drink, Bacchus, I drink; yes, deeper than the Cyclops drunk when he had 
filled his belly with the flesh of men;  would that I could dash out the brains of 
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my foe and drain Philip’s skull to the dregs, Philip who tastes of the blood of 




Alcaeus presents Philip as a monster who violates the rules of hospitality.
73
  The mention in 
the final line of Philip poisoning his guests refers to a common accusation leveled against 
Philip. There are many incidences of this accusation which are known to be untrue.
74
  The 
date of the poem is not certain. Walbank connects it chronologically with Anth. Pal. 11.12, 
because the two poems have similar themes. This other poem refers to the deaths of two 
Greeks, Callias and Epicrates, which Walbank says must have occurred after 198. The 
Achaean politician Aristaenus would have referred to their deaths in the speech he delivered 
in that year, yet there is no mention of them in Livy’s account.
75
  This is not a satisfactory 
justification for dating Anth. Pal. 9.519 to after 198. This poem need not come from the same 
year as Anth. Pal. 11.12, and Livy’s version of Aristaenus’ speech could have excluded 
references that seemed irrelevant to the Roman author, even if they were included in 
Polybius’ version of the speech. 
 An exact date is not necessary to show that Alcaeus was no friend of Philip. In 
addition to the poem quoted above, a story related by Plutarch also shows the aggression of 
the Greek poet toward the Macedonian king. Alcaeus composed a poem mocking Philip for 
his defeat at Cynoscephalae, to which Philip responded with his own poem threatening to 
crucify the Messenian poet.
76
  Whether Anth. Pal. 11.12 and 9.519 date before or after 198 
does not diminish their value for demonstrating Alcaeus’ antagonistic relationship with the 
Philip.  
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 It is uncertain if Alcaeus once supported Philip V, or if the Greek poet was alienated 
from the king in 215, or perhaps after 201, but by the time Philip was defeated at 
Cynoscephalae, Alcaeus was certainly Philip’s enemy.
77
  Whether Alcaeus was ever 
sympathetic toward Philip depends on whether the praise of the Macedonian king in another 
of his epigrams, Anth. Pal. 518, is genuine or sarcastic. In using Alcaeus’ poetry to determine 
Greek attitudes toward Rome, it is worth noting that anti-Macedonian does not necessarily 
mean to be pro-Roman. However, the resentment toward Philip felt by Messenians and 
expressed in Alcaeus’ poems supports the contention that Alcaeus viewed Flamininus’ 
settlement of Greece, whereby Greece was freed, as a positive development.  
 Feelings of gratitude toward Rome were not limited to the immediate aftermath of the 
Isthmian Declaration in 196. A series of inscriptions contemporary with the Syrian War (192-
188) demonstrate such feelings of gratitude among the Delphians. Delphi had been under the 
control of the Aetolian League since before 290, and the Aetolians had even begun to 
dominate the Amphictyonic Council, the federal league centered at Delphi which included 
representatives from throughout Greece.
78
  The Delphians were liberated from Aetolian 
control in 190 by Manius Acilius Glabrio. They constructed an equestrian statue in Glabrio’s 
honor, and on the base of the statue inscribed a dedication to the Roman and a letter of 
Glabrio’s to the city of Delphi, among other documents.
79
  
 In the letter dating to sometime in 190 Acilius responded to a complaint the 
Delphians sent to him that the Aetolians still controlled land near Delphi. The letter 
contained a list of properties which Acilius gave to the city and to Apollo.
80
  Although the 
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text is incomplete, Acilius seems to have acknowledged the autonomy of the city and the 
sanctuary.
81
  Taken together with the statue itself, the letter shows that the Delphians were 
honoring Glabrio for his liberation of the city and his restoration of property formerly held by 
the Aetolians.  
 The free status of Delphi was confirmed by the Senate shortly after Glabrio wrote this 
letter, as indicated by a letter of 189 from the Roman praetor Spurius Postumius to the 
Delphians which was inscribed on a large marble stele.
82
  Postumius told the Delphians “that 
it has been decreed by the Senate that both the sanctuary of Apollo, and the city be inviolate, 
that both the city and the territory of Delphi be exempt from taxation, and that its citizens be 




 In another letter also preserved on the base of the statue of Acilius Glabrio, Gaius 
Livius Salinator, the Roman consul for 189, promised to grant further assistance to the 
Delphians.
84
  Livius explains that the earlier envoys sent by the Delphians to Rome had been 
murdered and that the Romans would find and punish the killers. Rome would make the 
Aetolians return plunder they had taken from Delphi and ensure that the Aetolians would not 
loot the Delphians again. Livius also mentions that the Delphians had established games and 
offered sacrifices in honor of the Romans.
85
  He ends the letter by promising that the Romans 
“shall endeavor always to be the author of some good to the Delphians, on account of both 
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the god and yourselves, and because it is [their] ancestral practice to reverence the gods and 
to honor them as being the authors of all blessings.”
86
  
 Throughout Greece, cities offered dedications and gave honors to the Romans. The 
Chalcidians dedicated offerings to Titus Quinctius Flamininus, and even established a priest 
of Titus, both of which lasted at least until the time of Plutarch.
87
  The city was granted 
freedom by the Romans, even though it had shown allegiance to Philip.
88
  At Gytheum, 
Flamininus was referred to as “savior.”
89
 
 During the second century, Rhomaia festivals and cults of Roma were established in 
numerous Greek cities. The earliest known temple of the city of Rome was at Smyrna in 195, 
although this is attested by the later author Tacitus.
90
  The Smyrnaeans were being attacked 
by Antiochus in 195
91
 and sought Roman support. Livy recorded an embassy from Alabanda 
in 170 in which the Alabandes “recalled that they had built a temple of the City of Rome and 
had instituted annual games for that goddess.”
92
  In 189, after a request from envoys from 
Alabanda, the consul Manius Vulso captured a fortress that had rebelled against the city and 
restored it to them. The temple of the city of Rome may date to that year.
93
  Rome granted 
Magnesia freedom from the Attalids after Apamea and the city established games in honor of 
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  While the evidence for many of these honors comes from later sources, the 
priesthood of Flamininus at Chalcis and the games dedicated to Rome at Delphi support 
Mellor’s’ contention that many Greek dedications to Rome date to the time of Antiochus’ 
defeat.
95
  Such dedications could have been used to encourage Roman support, discourage 
Roman hostility, or express gratitude for Rome’s benevolence.  
 Greeks often sought out Roman intervention across the Adriatic. Numerous 
embassies came to Rome seeking aid. When Rome did choose to intervene, it presented itself 
as a liberator, as the policy of Titus Quinctius Flamininus demonstrates. During the First 
Macedonian War, Roman involvement was minimal. After Roman forces returned to Italy, 
Rome often took a relaxed approach to control in Greece. For a number of years after the 
Isthmian Declaration, Greeks praised Flamininus and the Romans for liberating them from 
subjugation by the Hellenistic kings. Feelings of gratitude can be seen in the writing of 
Alcaeus, the dedications to Rome and certain Romans, the series of inscriptions from Delphi 
dating to the final years of the war with Syria, and in Polybius’ and Livy’s account of the 
settlement after the Second Macedonian War. Although Rome would eventually be the 
unquestionable ruler of Greece, it is important to recognize that Roman assistance in the later 
3
rd
 and early 2
nd
 centuries was gratefully accepted by many Greeks who faced aggression 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE ROMAN THREAT TO GREEK FREEDOM 
 
 
 While the power of Rome aided many Greeks in their military conflicts against other 
Hellenistic powers, to other Greeks it represented a limit on their autonomy and a threat to 
their freedom. Roman actions in Greece showed the Republic’s strength and desire to enforce 
its will. Greeks often demonstrated their fear and resentment about Rome’s growing 
influence in the East.  
 Although embassies from multiple Greek states sought Roman intervention against 
Philip in 201 and 200, Rome’s demonstration of power in the Second Macedonian War was a 
cause for concern. For many Greeks, this fear was eliminated by the Isthmian Declaration. 
The Aetolian League, however, was not impressed by the Declaration of Freedom in 196, 
and became Rome’s most outspoken opponent in Greece years before most other Greeks 
expressed similar resentment. While many other Greeks initially viewed the Isthmian 
Declaration as genuine, more Greeks gradually began to be skeptical of the freedom Rome 
claimed to have granted them. The policies of important Achaean League politicians reveal 
that it did not take long for the Greeks of the Peloponnese to see Rome as an oppressor 
instead of a liberator.  When Perseus appeared to be a potential rival to Rome, many Greeks 
were hopeful that a balance of power could be achieved that would replace the previous 
preeminence of Rome. 
 
Roman Imperialism 
  After the beginning of the First Macedonian War in 214, Roman actions across the 
Adriatic Sea often infringed on the freedom of the Greeks. Violence from Roman generals, 
Roman settlements after the various wars, and the Senate’s expectation to be consulted by 
55  
Greeks about important, internal Greek affairs demonstrate the increasing degree of Roman 
power and control in Hellas.  
 Although Roman involvement in the First Macedonian War was limited, Roman 
violence was suffered by Greeks. For example, in 211, Laevinus captured the island 
Zakynthus, Oeniadae and Nassus. Oeniadae and Nassus were then given to the Aetolian 
League.
1
  The Romans also plundered Oreum, captured Anticyra and sold off its inhabitants 
as slaves, and pillaged Dymae.
2
    
 The Greeks in the East would also have been aware of the brutality of the Roman 
destruction of Syracuse, a Greek city in Sicily that was a casualty of the Second Punic War, 
and the violence Roman forces had committed against other cities in Italy that had sided with 
Hannibal.
3
  Livy refers to the “many wicked examples of anger and many of avarice” that 
Romans committed during the siege of Syracuse.
4
  In Polybius’ description of the sack of 
New Carthage in Spain in 209, he says that it was the Roman custom when sacking a city “to 
kill all they encountered, sparing none.”
5
  Livy provides a similar description of large scale 
violence and plunder for the sack of Tarentum, another Greek city in Italy that sided with 
Hannibal, in the same year.
6
  
 The violence continued when Rome again crossed the Adriatic during the Second 
Macedonian War. In 200, Roman forces devastated Chalcis. The same year, Galba’s 
lieutenant tried to convince the people of Antipatreia to surrender. When they refused, 
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Roman troops killed all the men of military age, and burned the city.
7
  Soon after, the town of 
Codrio surrendered, out of fear it would be treated in the same way. Violence against Greeks 
did not stop when Flamininus took command in 198. T. Flamininus’ forces plundered Elatia, 
then sacked and burned Phaloria. Naval forces under his brother, Lucius, sacked Eretria.
8
  In 
197, T. Flamininus took five thousand slaves.
9
    
 Sulpicius Galba (proconsul from 210 to 206 and consul in 200), Flamininus, and the 
Roman forces acquired a reputation for violence at this time.
10
 When Aegina was captured, 
Galba at first refused to allow the captives to send envoys to get ransom payments.
11
  Appian 
says that in the Achaean League debate in 198, much of the opposition to Rome was due to 
“certain outrages against Greece committed by Sulpicius.”
12
  Pausanias says that the 
Achaeans criticized Flamininus for Roman treatment of Greek cities that were unwilling 
subjects of Philip.
13
  Sometimes slavery and violence were used to punish traitorous cities,
14
 
and when such violence was used against cities who had not betrayed Rome, it would have 
been viewed as especially heinous. This may explain the Achaean censure of Flamininus, 
who acquired a reputation similar to Galba’s.
15
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 Romans were not unique in the use of excessive violence and profiting from warfare 
through slavery and plunder. In 220, the Cnossians captured the women and children of 
Lyttus and destroyed the town.
16
  In 202, Philip told the Thasians that if they surrendered he 
would not tax them or put a garrison in their town. Once they surrendered he enslaved 
them.
17
  A few years later, Philip had his soldiers sack and burn towns in Thessaly, his ally at 
the time, so that the Romans could not profit from them.
18
  Livy, citing Polybius as his 
source, says that by 194 there were twelve hundred Roman citizens in Achaea alone who 
were enslaved during the Hannibalic War and sold to the Greeks.
19
  Regardless of how 
common these practices were, however, Roman actions still would have generated fear and 
hatred among the Greeks.  
 Besides committing acts of violence, Rome decided what the state of affairs would be 
in Greece. During the First Macedonian War, Rome gave land that it had taken to the 
Aetolian League.  After the Second Macedonian War, it was Rome that decided what the 
settlement would be. Flamininus ignored the requests of Alexander the Aetolian and King 
Amnyander to remove Philip from power.
20
   When Flamininus proclaimed Greek freedom, it 
was freedom given with Rome’s permission. The first Greeks mentioned in the Isthmian 
Declaration were the Corinthians, Phocians, and Locrians, whom Rome had made subject to 
the Achaean and Aetolian Leagues as part of the settlement.
21
  Rome had promised Corinth 
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to the Achaean League in order to convince the Peloponnesian Greeks to join their side.
22
  
Rome’s willingness to subjugate weaker Greek states to stronger ones as a way to gain 
support was noted by the Greeks. In the opening stages of the war between Rome and the 
Aetolians, Demetrias joined the Aetolian League partially out of fear that Rome would return 
them to Philip’s control.
23
   
 Even Flamininus’ attempts to demonstrate Rome’s goodwill could cause Rome to 
appear as violent and controlling. In 196, the Boeotians asked Flamininus to allow those who 
had sided with Philip to return home. Flamininus allowed their return, hoping for Boeotian 
support.
24
  The Boeotians then elected one of the pro-Macedonians, Brachylles, to public 
office and sent a message to Philip to thank him for the soldiers return. Zeuxippus and other 
Boeotians who favored Rome asked Flamininus for his assistance in murdering Brachylles. 
Flamininus said that he would not involve himself but also would not stop them from 
carrying out the assassination. When the attempt failed, it spurred anti-Roman sentiment in 
Boeotia, and Romans troops in the area where killed.
25
  
 During the period after Antiochus’ defeat, Rome expected Greeks to consult the 
Senate on controversies in the East. In 183, Messene attempted to secede from the Achaean 
League. Rome had initially said that it did not care about the problems of the Achaeans. After 
the Achaeans had successfully put down the rebellion, the Senate told the same Achaean 
ambassadors that Rome had ensured that supplies and grain would not be sent to Messene. 
Polybius says that “this made it patent to every one that so far from shirking and neglecting 
less important items of foreign affairs, they were on the contrary displeased if all matters 
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were not submitted to them and if all was not done in accordance with their decision.”
26
  
Unlike other forms of Hellenistic arbitration, Rome expected to have a say in Greek affairs, 
even if the Senate’s resolution was indecisive.
27
  For example, Roman ambassadors told the 
Achaean League to consult Rome when Sparta attacked Las in 189
28
  and when Messene 
began to revolt in183.
29
  
 In the aftermath of Perseus’ defeat in 168, Rome exercised greater control over the 
East than it ever had before. Strabo, citing Polybius, says that Lucius Aemilius Paullus 
destroyed seventy cities in Macedonia and sold off one hundred and fifty thousand prisoners 
as slaves.
30
 Pro-Roman governments were encouraged throughout the East. Paullus approved 
the murder of five hundred and fifty Aetolians and the exile of others because they had 
favored Perseus.
31
  Over 1,000 Achaeans, including Polybius, were taken to Italy as hostages, 




The Aetolian League  
The Aetolian League, the confederacy of city-states in southern mainland Greece, 
was Rome’s most vocal opponent among the Greeks after the end of the Second Macedonian 
War and consistently challenged the image of Rome as the liberator of Greece.   The 
Aetolians and Romans were allies in the First Macedonian War after signing a treaty in 212, 
but the Aetolian peace treaty with Philip in 206 marked the beginning of a rift that widened 
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in the aftermath of the Second Macedonian War. After the Battle of Cynoscephalae, 
Flamininus became irritated with the Aetolians for taking booty that he felt was owed to the 
Romans and for taking credit for Philip’s defeat.
33
  Polybius reports that the Aetolians also 
thought that the Roman proconsul was bribed by Philip when the king was granted an 
armistice.
34
   
In 195 the Aetolians sent ambassadors to the Senate to ask that they be given 
Pharsalus, Leaucas, and other areas that they thought the first treaty with Rome guaranteed 
them.
35
  Polybius, followed by Livy, traces the later war between the Romans and Antiochus 
and the Aetolians to this disagreement over Rome’s settlement after Philip’s defeat.
36
  Sacks 
thinks that Polybius has overdramatized the conflict following the end of the Second 
Macedonian War.
37
  According to Sacks, Polybius’ depiction of the Aetolians changes after 
the second war against Philip, and during the negotiations with Philip and Flamininus the 
Greek league is portrayed as the victim of Rome’s growing authority in the East. However, 
even if Polybius has exaggerated the role these confrontations played, it is unlikely that he 
has invented them completely. In Rome’s first two wars in the east, the Aetolians and Rome 
were allies, but after Cynoscephalae all of the ancient sources indicate a hostile relationship.  
The Roman slogan of Greek freedom was questioned most forcibly by the Aetolian 
League. Polybius says that the Aetolians were alone among the Greeks in viewing the 
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Isthmian Declaration with skepticism.
38
  They accused the Romans of being the new masters 
of Greece, and criticized the Romans for keeping garrisons in Corinth, Demetrias and 
Chalcis.
39
  When Polybius discusses the differences between historical causes and pretexts, 
he says that the Aetolians used as a pretext for war with Rome “the liberation of Greece, 
which they announced in defiance of reason and truth going round with Antiochus from city 
to city.”
40
   In 192 the Aetolians approved a decree inviting Antiochus to arbitrate between 
themselves and the Romans, and to liberate Greece.
41
  This is not simply a request to make 
Antiochus a “patron and judge.”
42
  At least since the Isthmian Declaration, Rome had 
cultivated an image as the liberator of the Greeks. There was no way the Aetolians could 
invite Antiochus to liberate Greece without directly challenging Rome’s place in the East.
43
   
Grainger argues that the Aetolians may have designed the invitation to Antiochus to 
arbitrate so that they would gather support from anti-Roman Greeks.
 44
  The point of the 
arbitration was to alter the terms of peace struck after Cynoscephalae. The Aetolians could 
have expected that Rome would not agree to this, as doing so would alienate the rest of 
Greece. On the other hand, refusing to allow Antiochus to arbitrate would provoke the king. 
Either way, the Aetolians would make someone more hostile toward Rome.  
In 193, the Aetolians sent ambassadors to Nabis of Sparta, Antiochus of Syria, and 
Philip in order to urge them to start a war with Rome.
45
  There was no immediate action 
taken against Rome. Gruen thinks that the commonly accepted narrative, where the Aetolians 
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sought a war with Rome in order to free Greece, exaggerates the importance of Rome in the 
Aetolians’ motivation.
46
  Regarding the ambassadors sent to the kings in 193, Gruen argues 
that it would have been an odd occasion to speak of liberating Greece from Rome after Rome 
had removed all its garrisons the previous year.
47
   Instead, Gruen thinks that the Aetolians 
were pursuing their own imperialist schemes, and were simply taking advantage of the 
opportunity that the lack of Roman forces provided.  
This approach cannot be accepted. As Gruen himself points out, the Senate’s main 
concern in the East at this time was possibility of a war with Antiochus.
48
  Although Rome 
removed its troops from the East, the Aetolians could easily have suspected that urging 
Antiochus to war would provoke hostility from Rome. Gruen explains the envoys to Philip 
and Antiochus by saying that they would provide potential allies in case of Roman 
interference.  This explanation still suggests that the Aetolians feared a reaction from Rome.  
Furthermore, Gruen’s suggestion that the Aetolian leader, Thoas, sought to expand 
Aetolian territory and to keep the Achaean League occupied by a conflict with Nabis is not 
supported by the text. Livy says that Thoas “complained about the injuries of the Romans 
and the state of Aetolia, because they were the most unrewarded of all the peoples and states 
of Greece after that victory, of which they themselves were the cause.”
49
 Gruen cites this as 
evidence that the Aetolians wanted to recover land they thought they had earned after 
Cynoscephalae and to expand Aetolian territory. Gruen refers to a comment from a speech of 
Aristaenus in 195 that the Achaeans were not protected from the Aetolians by the sea that 
separated them and that the Peloponnesians did not want the Aetolians to have a base at 
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Argos, in the Peloponnese.
50
  Gruen infers that Aetolian expansion would provoke a response 
from the Achaeans unless they were occupied with Nabis. 
It is true that the Aetolians were dissatisfied with the settlement after Philip’s defeat, 
but it is not clear how these ambassadors sent to Antiochus, Philip, and Nabis would have 
helped the Aetolians recover those cities. Even assuming Aristaenus said what Livy reports, 
that the Achaeans did not want the Aetolians to have a base at Argos, unlike Argos the cities 
the Aetolians were seeking to recover were in Thessaly, quite a distance removed from 
Achaea.
51
  Livy also does not report any military activity taken by the Aetolians to expand 
their territory after these ambassadors were sent. Gruen’s reconstruction of the embassies 
does not provide a valid explanation for why they were sent.  
When Antiochus brought troops into Greece, the Aetolians elected him their 
commander. Even after this, Gruen maintains that the Aetolians were hoping to avoid a war 
with Rome. He says that Thoas, the Aetolian magistrate responsible for encouraging the 
assembly to elect Antiochus, also prevented Antiochus from sending Hannibal to start 
conflict in Africa, which would have certainly caused Roman resistance.
52
  However, Livy 
says that Thoas’ reason for opposing this move was that it would weaken Antiochus’ forces 
in Greece, which hardly indicates that the Aetolians were avoiding a war with Rome.
53
  
Hannibal remaining with Antiochus would have also appeared antagonistic toward Rome.  
Gruen also argues that when the Aetolians elected Antiochus as their commander, it 
was merely a symbolic move, similar to when Aetolia had given this name to Attalus in 209. 
In the First Macedonian War, the Aetolians and Pergamum acted separately, and the Aetolian 
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relationship with Antiochus should be seen in the same light. However, even if the Aetolians 
acted separately from Attalus in 209, both were at war with Philip. If this shows anything 
about the Aetolian position towards Rome, it shows that they were expecting war, not 
avoiding it.  
Besides directly opposing Rome’s liberation propaganda by substituting Antiochus as 
Greece’s new savior, the Aetolians probably created a story about a Roman consultation of 
the Delphic Oracle which portrayed the Romans as conquerors. A story is preserved by the 
2
nd
 century AD paradoxographer, Phlegon of Tralles, who cites Antisthenes the Peripatetic, a 
contemporary of the Syrian war (192-188). According to the story, after the battle of 
Thermopylae in 19 one of Antiochus’ deceased commanders rose from the dead to tell the 
Romans that Zeus would send an army to Italy if they did not stop plundering the dead 
Syrians. Alarmed by the occurrence, the Romans consulted the Delphic Oracle on how to 
proceed. The Oracle responded:
54
  
  Restrain yourself now, Roman, and let justice abide with you,  
  Lest Pallas stir up a much greater Ares against you, 
  And make desolate your market-places, and you, fool, for all your effort, 
  Lose much wealth before reaching your land. 
 
After consulting the Oracle, the Romans traveled to Naupactus to make sacrifices at a 
Panhellenic sanctuary. There an unspecified Publius made a number of prophetic utterances 
of his own, and then was eaten by a wolf. After he was eaten, Publius’ head made one final 
prophecy, and the remaining soldiers built a temple to Apollo, and then traveled home.
55
 
 The prophecy that is attributed to Delphi may not have come from the Delphic 
Oracle, but still shows contemporary Aetolian propaganda. Parke and Fontenrose both think 
that the oracle comes from the time of the Syrian War but deny that it came from the Delphic 
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Oracle. They claim that to accept the oracle as authentic would require one to accept the 
reason for the consultation: the decapitated Syrian threatening Rome.
56
  However, it is 
possible that the prophecy did come from the Pythia and was inserted into this context by a 
later author. Whether the prophecy came from the Delphic Oracle or not, it is not necessary 
to doubt that the prophecy is contemporary with events it describes, or to reject Phlegon’s 
citation of Antisthenes. As Parke points out, there is no reference to later eastern threats to 
Rome, such as Mithridates, and there would be no reason to fabricate the prophecy after 
Antiochus had already been defeated in 189.
57
   
 Parke thinks that the prophecies reported by Antisthenes through Phlegon were 
invented by a pro-Aetolian Delphian between 190 and 189. However, whether the prophecy 
came from the Pythia or not, a story about the Oracle threatening Rome at this time would 
have seemed out of place in light of Rome’s liberation of Delphi from the Aetolians in 190 
and the subsequent pro-Roman sentiment at Delphi.
 58
  A more plausible time frame is 
between the defeat of Antiochus at Thermopylae, and the liberation of Delphi in 190. During 
this time, Delphi was still under Aetolian control, and the prophecies warning Rome to stop 
its injustices in Greece would have been given more credence.  
As the Syrian War came to close, Aetolian hatred of Rome would only have been 
encouraged. After their defeat at the Battle of Heraclea in 190, the Aetolians decided to 
surrender themselves to the good faith of the Roman people, the Roman equivalent of 
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  After the Aetolian ambassadors were treated harshly by the 
consul Glabrio, however, many Aetolians refused to participate in a peace discussion, and the 
war continued.
60
  When they were finally forced to accept Roman terms, the Aetolians lost 
their political autonomy. The treaty between the Romans and Aetolians was more restrictive 
than Roman treaties with any other Greek people up to that point. The treaty said that the 
Aetolians “shall preserve without fraud the empire and majesty of the Roman people…they 
shall have the same enemies as the Roman people, and on whomever the Romans make war 
the people of Aetolia shall make war likewise.”
61
  Although there are no extant references to 
Roman and Aetolian interaction in the following fifteen years,
62
  for the first time the 
Romans had taken away from a Greek state the right to control its own interstate relations.
63
 
Whether Rome issued orders to the League or not does not change the fact that the Aetolians 




 The Achaean League was not as openly hostile towards Rome as the Aetolian 
League, but the Greek federation in the Peloponnese often opposed Rome’s presence in the 
East. Many times when the Achaeans did cooperate with Rome, it was through fear. The 
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 Achaean politicians in the early 3
rd
 century were generally divided into two camps 
regarding their views towards Rome. These two parties were headed by Aristaenus and 
Philopoemen, whose policies are compared by Polybius in Book 24. Aristaenus felt that 
Rome was too powerful for the Achaeans to do what was honorable, and all that remained 
was for the Achaeans to do what was in their own best interest. This meant ignoring previous 
laws and treaties when Rome so willed.
65
  Philopoemen acknowledged Rome’s superiority. 
However, he also thought that the Achaeans should try to abide by the rules of the treaties 
and alliances they had made, even when that meant opposing Rome.
66
 Even so, Philopoemen 
acknowledged that even when the Achaeans protested and were legally in the right, they still 
would have to follow Rome’s orders in some cases.
67
  Polybius presents these two positions 
not in speeches by each politician, but rather as a theoretical discussion in the authorial voice 
of each politician.
68
  According to Polybius, both of these politicians admitted that Roman 




 Aristaenus’ view that Achaean stability could be maintained through subservience to 
Rome is demonstrated by his support of Rome in the Second Macedonian War. In his 
discussion of treachery, Polybius says that “if Aristaenus had not then in good time made the 
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Achaeans throw off their alliance with Philip and change it for that with Rome, the whole 
nation would evidently have suffered utter destruction.”
70
  Aristaenus’ willingness to 
abandon the treaty with Philip is the only example available of him ignoring previous treaties 
in order to side with Rome. For this reason, Errington claims that Polybius has created a 
contrast between Aristaenus and Philopoemen which did not actually exist.
71
   
 While it is true that Aristaenus’ decision to abandon the Achaean treaty with Philip is 
the only example of this policy that remains, it is unfair to dismiss Polybius’ testimony 
entirely. Polybius defends Aristaenus against the charge of being a traitor and seems to have 
a favorable view towards him.
72
  Yet Aristaenus’ policy is very similar to that of Callicrates, 
for whom Polybius had no sympathy. Polybius depicts Callicrates as a Roman sycophant and 
attributes to him much of the blame for the fall of the Achaean League.
73
   If Aristaenus did 
not adhere in some way to the policy Polybius attributes to him, the Greek historian would 
not ascribe to him the same policy as Callicrates.  
 There are other examples of Achaeans acceding to Rome’s wishes. In 184, when four 
different Spartan embassies came to Rome with complaints against the Achaeans, the 
Achaeans allowed the return of one of the groups of Spartan exiles on Roman orders, despite 
the fact that it violated one of their inscribed laws.
74
  After Appius Claudius threatened the 
Achaeans in 184, they gave in to the Romans demands and repealed the death sentence of 
two Spartan leaders, Areus and Alexander.
75
  Polybius also says that it was the policy of 
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Callicrates and Hyperbatus to accede to Roman wishes.
76
   Whether Polybius has 
misrepresented Aristaenus’ position or not, there were those in Achaea who felt that 
following Rome’s request was best.   
 It bears repeating that before 167 not all Achaeans thought that Roman orders needed 
to be obeyed, as Philopoemen and his followers show.
77
  In the Second Macedonian War, the 
Roman war against Philip was advantageous to Philopoemen in distancing the Achaean 
League from dependence on the Macedonian king.
78
  However, tension began to develop 
between Rome and the Achaeans, and especially between Philopoemen and Flamininus, 
between the Isthmian Declaration and the war with Syria. Flamininus became jealous of 
Philopoemen for receiving more of the credit for defeating Nabis of Sparta, and Philopoemen 
became disillusioned with the Roman declaration of freedom after Flamininus told the 
Achaeans to wait for Roman forces before they responded to aggression from the Spartan 
king.
79




Supporters of Perseus 
 
 When Philip’s son Perseus took the throne in 179, he began to gather support in 
Greece by allowing debtors and fugitives to return to Macedonia and by relieving debts in his 
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  In 172, after nearly two decades of Roman unipolarity in the East, the Third 
Macedonian War generated hopes among Greeks for a new balance of power. Polybius 
describes an upwelling of Greek support for Perseus after his initial victory at Callinicus in 
171.
82
  Polybius attributes this not to any anti-Roman or pro-Macedonian leaning, but to 
people’s innate tendency to favor underdogs. However, Polybius was writing for a Roman 
audience as well as Greek,
83
 and his interpretation could have served as a defense of himself 
and other Greeks charged with anti-Romanism.  
 In Book 30, Polybius directly addresses the mentality of anti-Roman Greeks, which 
he divides into three groups. The first group consists of those who did not want to see either 
Rome or Perseus achieve absolute power. The second includes people who wanted to see 
Perseus win, but could not convince their community. The third comprises those who favored 
Perseus, and were successful in convincing their states to support the Macedonian king.
84
  In 
a passage thought to derive from Polybius, Livy provides another analysis of Greek views of 
the war.
 85
 Livy says that the plebs in Greece favored Perseus. Among the principes, some 
sought political support from Rome, others were Macedonian sycophants, and still others 
hoped to get out of their own debts if there was a massive political change. Another group 
followed the masses in favoring Macedon, and still others preferred Rome to Perseus, but 
really wanted neither side to be more powerful.
86
  These reconstructions of Greek views are 
theoretical and possibly over-schematic, but Polybius is speaking from personal experience 
on this matter, as he was well into his political career by this point. 
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 Polybius’ division of Greek political leaders into pro- and anti-Macedonian groups is 
exemplified by Rhodian politics in the 170s. After Antiochus’ defeat, Rome had given Lycia 
to the Rhodians “as a gift.”
87
  However, in 178 after Lycians complained to Rome about 
Rhodian oppression, the Senate sent a letter to the Rhodians telling them “the Lycians had 
not been handed over to the Rhodians as a gift, but rather to be treated like friends and 
allies.”
88
  The Romans made no effort to enforce this change, but the reversal of Rome’s 
decision could have encouraged resentment from the Rhodians.
89
  
 Popular resentment of Rome at Rhodes was exacerbated when Gaius Lucretius, 
praetor in 171, sent a Greek slave as a messenger to Rhodes to ask for Rhodian naval 
support.
90
  The Rhodians debated whether to send the ships or not. The two sides came to a 
compromise, and sent only six of the available forty vessels.
91
  Polybius claims that two 
Rhodians, Deinon and Polyaratus, were the leaders of the party that favored Perseus.
92
  They 
clashed with two other Rhodians, Philophron and Theaedetus, on whether to ransom 
Macedonian prisoners back to Perseus or not. Deinon and Polyaratus’ opinion won the day, 
and the Macedonians were returned to Perseus.
93
  Perseus recognized the division and sent a 
mission to Rhodes attempting to convince the Rhodians to join him.
94
 The Macedonian king 
was not able to convince them to join him and the Rhodians encouraged him to seek peace.
95
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The point is not to show that Rhodes supported Perseus during the war. However, Polybius 
shows that there was a division among Rhodian politicians on what was in their best interest. 
  Gruen dismisses the idea that Rhodian politics before and during the Third 
Macedonian War were the result of conflicts between pro- and anti- Roman groups. Instead, 
he argues that the tradition in Livy and Polybius has been distorted by three sources: Roman 
annalists who sought to defend Rome’s harsh punishment of Rhodes after 167 by depicting 
Rhodes as a staunch supporter of Perseus, Polybius’ Rhodian sources who sought to place 
blame for Rhodian actions on the party of Deinon and Polyaratus and draw blame away from 
themselves, and Polybius himself, who wanted to create a distinction between anti-Roman 




 These problems do provide adequate reasons to completely reject the ancient sources’ 
testimony on the internal political disputes at Rhodes.  That the Roman tradition amplified 
Rhodes’ hostility toward Rome seems indubitable: Livy reports an episode from 169 that is 
not attested elsewhere. Rhodian ambassadors threaten to take action against either Perseus or 
Rome if either side prevents peace.
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  However, Rhodian support of Perseus is not entirely an 
annalistic fabrication, since it appears throughout Polybius’ narrative as well.  Polybius’ 
Rhodian sources may have placed too much of the blame for Rhodes actions’ on their 
political opponents, but they could not have done this unless that party had expressed some 
support for Perseus. Finally, unless Polybius perceived an actual difference between his own 
policies and those of Deinon and Polyaratus, he would not have included comments so 
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disparaging and critical of those two politicians.
98
  Polybius may have taken advantage of the 
biases in his Rhodian sources, but this is not grounds to dismiss his evidence on Rhodian 
attitudes.  
 The Republic had demonstrated its strength in a series of violent wars that resulted in 
a Roman rearrangement of Greece. After Apamea, the Senate expected to be consulted by 
Greeks about internal Greek affairs, although it rarely dedicated resources to enforcing its 
decisions. The Aetolian and Achaean League, the two most powerful Greek states, reacted to 
Roman power in different ways. When Rome denied the Aetolians the reward they thought 
they deserved, the Aetolians resented Rome’s intrusions in the East and supported Antiochus 
as a new liberator of the Hellenes. For many Achaeans, Rome could be treated as an ally 
rather than a ruler. For others, Roman orders took precedence over Greek laws and treaties.  
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 Forty seven years after Rome began its first war against Macedon, the political 
landscape of the Greek east had changed drastically. The Seleucid monarch had been forced 
to keep out of Europe and the kingdom of Macedonia was torn apart. The Aetolian League 
lost control of its foreign affairs. The Achaean League was drained of politicians. Rome was 
the agent of all these changes. But there were other effects of Roman involvement in this 
period.  Thessaly was freed from Philip V. The Delphians were freed from Aetolian control. 
The imperialist agendas of Philip and Antiochus in Greece had been stopped. From 215 to 
167, Greek views of Rome varied because of the varied effects Roman involvement had in 
the East. 
 During the First Macedonian War, Rome’s goal was limited to keeping Philip 
occupied in the east and to prevent him from assisting Hannibal in Italy. Some Greeks 
resented the foreign power’s violent intrusion in their spheres of influence. However, the 
view of some modern scholars that neutral Greeks intentionally tried to halt Rome’s advance 
into Greece or sought peace in a conscious resistance to Rome is mistaken. Such a view 
relies too heavily on the language of speeches in Polybius and Livy, which are anachronistic 
reconstructions written from a period when Roman authority was indisputable. Polybius 
disapproves of inventing speeches when writing history, but he also thinks personal 
experience is important for a historian. As an exile in Rome who resented the Aetolian 
League, Polybius amplified Greek fear of Rome.  Livy follows Polybius for many of his 
speeches and makes some changes to glorify Rome. Two of these speeches, those of 
Lyciscus in 211 and the Macedonian orator in 209, were not even delivered by neutral 
Greeks, and do not show how neutral Greeks reacted.  
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 A few years after the Peace of Phoenice, many of the same Greeks who attempted to 
mediate the first Macedonian war came to Rome seeking military assistance against the 
combined might of Philip and Antiochus. Rome’s commitment in the Second Macedonian 
War was significantly greater than in the previous war against Philip, and both the Achaean 
and Aetolian Leagues sided with Rome. Livy’s recreations of the Achaean and Aetolian 
League debates before joining Rome reflect a genuine fear among Greeks of Rome’s 
strength. When Greeks gathered at Corinth in 196 and heard Flamininus’ famous declaration, 
Rome’s promise of Greek freedom relieved much of those fears. But some viewed the 
Isthmian Declaration as a charade. In the eyes of Aetolians, the Romans had abandoned them 
against Philip in the First Macedonian War and denied them their rightful property after the 
Second. Rome claimed to be freeing the Greeks while in reality Roman troops held the 
“Fetters of Greece.” Violence against Roman troops in Boeotia and Demetrias’ defection to 
the Aetolian league demonstrate that such views were not limited to the Aetolians.  
 After Antiochus’ defeat, Rome had proven its power to all in the Mediterranean. 
Unlike other Hellenistic powers, Rome still showed no interest in annexing territory in 
Greece and kept no garrisons in the east. The Senate often avoided making decisions on 
Greek affairs and was more interested in issues in the Western Mediterranean. Such 
hesitancy at Rome led many, like Philopoemen, to maintain that Greek politics could be 
carried on without submission to the Republic.  
 Not all shared Philopoemen’s view. Other Achaeans thought it was necessary to give 
in to Rome even to the point of violating Achaean laws. The defeat of Antiochus and Philip 
meant that no state existed that was powerful enough to challenge Rome. Later, many Greeks 
hoped that Perseus would combat Rome’s hegemony, as Rome had done with the Hellenistic 
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kings a few decades earlier. Internal politics at Rhodes illustrate the division of Greeks at this 
time.  
 The accounts of ancient historians are essential to any study of the Macedonian Wars, 
but these authors have imposed their own view of history on their narratives. When viewed 
separately from each author’s interpretations and embellishments, the actions of various 
Hellenistic states illustrate the changing relations between Greeks and Romans. 
Contemporary evidence reinforces some of what the ancient authors say. The poems of 
Alcaeus and inscriptions from Delphi show that some Greeks accepted Rome’s claim to be 
liberating Greece. The prophecy preserved by Phlegon should be seen in the context of 
Aetolian opposition to Rome and control of Delphi. When placed in the background provided 
by the ancient historians, these other sources demonstrate the range and changes in Greek 
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